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The Surprising Views of Montesquieu and
Tocqueville about Juries: Juries Empower Judges
Renée Lettow Lerner*1
ABSTRACT
Both Montesquieu and Tocqueville thought that an independent
judiciary was key to maintaining a moderate government of ordered
liberty. But judicial power should not be exercised too openly, or the
people would view judges as tyrannical. In Montesquieu’s and
Tocqueville’s view, the jury was an excellent mask for the power of
judges. Both Montesquieu and Tocqueville thought that popular juries had
many weaknesses in deciding cases. But, as Tocqueville made clear, the
firm guidance of the judge in instructions on law and comments on
evidence could prevent juries from going astray and make the institution a
“free school” for democracy.
The Article explores Montesquieu’s legacy concerning judges and
juries in the arguments of both the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists. It
also examines the American antecedents of Tocqueville’s idea of the jury
as a school for democracy.
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INTRODUCTION

We American legal professionals think we know about Montesquieu
and Tocqueville. Or, at least, we think we know enough. Montesquieu
developed the three-fold separation of powers embodied in the structure
of the U.S. Constitution and the federal government.2 He also supported
use of lay juries.3 Tocqueville wrote that the jury is a school for
democracy.4 He also quipped that, in America, sooner or later, almost
every political question becomes a judicial question.5 The vast majority of
us stop there and call it a day, without bothering actually to read them, or,
if we do, only in tiny, isolated, and easily digested snippets.
2. CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE
LAWS 156–57 (bk. 11, ch. 6) (Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller & Harold
Samuel Stone trans. & eds., 1989) (1748).
3. Id. at 158.
4. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 275 (J.P. Mayer
ed., George Lawrence trans., 1969) (1835).
5. Id. at 270.

348056-LSU_81-1_Text.indd 6

12/2/20 7:03 AM

2020]

MONTESQUIEU AND TOCQUEVILLE ABOUT JURIES

3

That is a mistake. These men were deep and influential thinkers.
Americans have too often found in Montesquieu and Tocqueville what
they wanted to find, not what is actually there. And of no topic is that more
true than the jury.
My own rude awakening came first about Tocqueville. I am writing a
book about the history of the civil jury in America. During my research, I
have come across scores of quotations of and paraphrases from
Tocqueville by American lawyers, judges, legal academics, and politicians
that the jury is a vital institution because it is a school for democracy.
These references began in the 1840s, soon after the publication of the first
American edition of Democracy in America in 1838.6 They have continued
without a break to the present.7 Having encountered so many of these
references to Tocqueville, I figured it was time to read him carefully
myself.
When I did, I was stunned. Tocqueville was not praising the jury at
all. At least, he was not praising the jury for anything that seemed familiar.
Tocqueville was praising the jury because the institution amplified the
influence of judges.
Shaken by that revelation, I turned to work on another book. The other
book is a condensed but sweeping account of the jury across time and the
globe. It was time now to be systematic, I thought, in describing the
purposes of the jury. I knew that Montesquieu praised the use of juries. I
also knew that he greatly influenced the American founders and the French
revolutionaries who introduced trial by jury to France in criminal cases.8
6. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (John C. Spencer
ed., Henry Reeve trans., 1838) (1835).
7. See, e.g., Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Foster, 5 Ga. 194, 205–06 (1848)
(Joseph Lumpkin, C.J.); AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION 93 (1998); Nancy S. Marder, The Jury as a ‘Free School’ for
Democracy, 5 INSIGHTS ON L. & SOC’Y 4, 4–6 (2005); Sheldon Whitehouse,
Restoring the Civil Jury’s Role in the Structure of Our Government, 55 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1241, 1268–69 (2014). Judges have also frequently quoted
Tocqueville’s characterization of the jury as a form of direct democracy. See, e.g.,
William G. Young, Vanishing Trials, Vanishing Juries, Vanishing Constitution,
40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 67, 71 (2006).
8. See, e.g., JAMES M. DONOVAN, JURIES AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN FRANCE IN THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES
28, 31 (2010); ADHÉMAR ESMEIN, A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 416 (John Simpson trans., 1914) (1882). Esmein explained that
Montesquieu especially influenced the French revolutionaries by his insistence
that the jury could only decide one fact. See infra text accompanying note 49. This
led the revolutionaries to decree that juries should only be presented with
questions about facts, essentially in the form of a special verdict.
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During the nineteenth century, the institution of the criminal jury spread
to other parts of Europe, particularly as governments made concessions to
liberals after the revolutions of 1848. France’s jury practice, influenced by
Montesquieu, was the initial European model.9 Montesquieu also
influenced early nineteenth-century Latin American liberals, who
introduced rights to jury trial after countries declared independence from
Spain and Portugal.10 In Montesquieu, I thought, I would get insight into
the attraction of the institution beyond the common-law world. With some
trepidation, because I was aware that Montesquieu can be obscure, I
opened the Spirit of the Laws.
Once again, I was astounded. Montesquieu was not praising the jury
for anything that seemed familiar. He advocated use of juries because the
institution masked the power of judges.
My first thought was that this could not be a coincidence. While
Tocqueville was writing Democracy in America, he told his cousin and
close friend that there were “three men with whom I commune a bit every
day, Pascal, Montesquieu, and Rousseau.”11
My second thought was that I could not be the first person to have
noticed this. Montesquieu and Tocqueville are major thinkers and have
been much studied. Someone must have seen that they valued juries
mainly for how the institution protected and augmented the power of
judges.
I found that almost no one has remarked on this distinctive feature of
Montesquieu’s work. Many scholars, French and otherwise, have treated
Montesquieu’s views of judges and juries as simply typical of eighteenthcentury enlightenment views. They have indiscriminately lumped his

9. See Gerhard Casper & Hans Zeisel, Lay Judges in the German Criminal
Courts, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 136–38 (l972). Caspar and Zeisel explained that
most of the German states borrowed the French practice of the special verdict. Id.
at 137–38.
10. On the influence of Montesquieu and French liberals on Mexican liberals
in the 1820s, and the introduction of jury trial in Mexico, see Charles A. Hale,
José María Luis Mora and the Structure of Mexican Liberalism, 45 HISPANIC AM.
HIST. REV. 196, 200–02 (1965); Hiroshi Fukurai, Clark R. Knudtson & Susan I.
Lopez, Is Mexico Ready for a Jury Trial? Comparative Analysis of Lay Justice
Systems in Mexico, the United States, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and
Ireland, 2 MEXICAN L. REV. 3, 12 (2009).
11. Alexis de Tocqueville, Letter to Louis de Kergorlay, 10 November 1836,
in 13 OEUVRES COMPLÈTES 148 (J.P. Mayer ed., 1951). On this triad, see PAUL O.
CARRESE, DEMOCRACY IN MODERATION: MONTESQUIEU, TOCQUEVILLE, AND
SUSTAINABLE LIBERALISM 85–86 (2016).
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thinking on these topics with, for example, that of Voltaire and Beccaria.12
Some scholars have found in Montesquieu a more distinctive teaching
about judges and judicial independence.13 The work of American political
scientist James Stoner is especially instructive.14
Then I discovered the work of Paul Carrese, in particular his 2003
book The Cloaking of Power: Montesquieu, Blackstone, and the Rise of
Judicial Activism. Carrese had seen that Montesquieu put judges and
judging at the center of his political ideas for protecting liberty.15 He also
had seen that Montesquieu recommended using lay juries in order to mask
the power of the judges.16
Carrese studies political philosophy. He is not a lawyer or legal
academic. This particular training, and lack of training, most likely
encouraged him to see what lawyers and legal academics have failed to
see. He makes profound observations about law and the place of judges in
government. He has drawn important connections between Montesquieu,
Blackstone, Hamilton, and Tocqueville.
But Carrese’s training in political philosophy also means that he is less
interested in, and knowledgeable about, a part of the legal system that legal
professionals are deeply concerned with: the process of adjudication.
Montesquieu, Blackstone, Hamilton, and Tocqueville were all legal
professionals, and closely concerned with adjudication. As a legal
historian, I am able to delve into the mechanisms that Montesquieu and
Tocqueville suggest for the exercise of judicial power. I can identify more

12. See, e.g., ESMEIN, supra note 8, at 359, 362–63, 369; ELIE CARCASSONNE,
MONTESQUIEU ET LE PROBLÈME DE LA CONSTITUTION FRANÇAISE AU XVIII
SIÈCLE Chs. 4–6 (1927); FRANKLIN L. FORD, ROBE AND SWORD: THE
REGROUPING OF THE FRENCH ARISTOCRACY AFTER LOUIS XIV 238–45 (1953).
13. Simone Goyard-Fabre, Le Réformisme de Montesquieu: Progrès
juridique et histoire, in LA PENSÉE POLITIQUE DE MONTESQUIEU: CAHIERS DE
PHILOSOPHIE POLITIQUE ET JURIDIQUE DE L’UNIVERSITÉ DE CAEN 66–67 (1985);
LOUIS ALTHUSSER, MONTESQUIEU: LA POLITIQUE ET L’HISTOIRE 98–103 (1959);
JUDITH SHKLAR, MONTESQUIEU 81, 88–91, 113, 124–25 (1987); René Cassin,
Montesquieu et la protection juridictionelle des libertés, in ACTES DU CONGRÈS
MONTESQUIEU 249–56 (Louis Desgraves ed., 1956); Georges Vlachos, Le
Pouvoir judiciaire dans L’Esprit des lois, in PROBLÈMES DE DROIT PUBLIC
CONTEMPORAIN: MÉLANGES EN L’HONNEUR DU PROFESSEUR MICHEL
STASSINOPOULOS (1974).
14. JAMES R. STONER, JR., COMMON LAW AND LIBERAL THEORY: COKE,
HOBBES, AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 154, 158 (1992).
15. PAUL O. CARRESE, THE CLOAKING OF POWER: MONTESQUIEU,
BLACKSTONE, AND THE RISE OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 16–17 (2003).
16. Id. at 49–50.
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clearly their criticisms of the use of lay juries. I am also able to evaluate
their ideas in light of the history of legal systems.
Briefly, my argument is this: Montesquieu and Tocqueville could see
the appeal of popular government. Both set liberty as the highest goal that
government could achieve. They saw that popular government could lead
to abuses and curtailments of liberty. Democracies and republics could
easily descend into tyranny. For Montesquieu and Tocqueville, one of the
central questions was how to incorporate popular participation in
government while tempering its excesses and preserving liberty. The main
answer they both gave was professional judges. An independent judiciary,
they thought, should focus on the rights of the individual and shield
individuals from tyranny. Such a judiciary would be an aristocratic,
moderating element in a republic.
But the judiciary must be careful in how it exercises this moderating
power. It must not exercise power too openly. If it did, then the people
would start to resent the judiciary as yet another tyrannical power. Judicial
power, to be effective, must be masked. There were different ways to do
this masking. One important way was to use juries.
For Montesquieu and Tocqueville, then, the main point of juries was
to mask judicial power. In their view, the primary purpose of juries was
not one of the standard justifications given by common-law lawyers and
judges: to provide direct popular participation in government, to render
more accurate decisions, or to counteract the biases of judges. Those goals
could be achieved by other means. But juries were a wonderful way of
deflecting attention and responsibility from judges. The judges could
claim that they were simply handing a case to a group of laypeople. The
result was not the judges’ fault, not their responsibility.
Meanwhile, of course, judges were supposed to exercise considerable
power in less obvious ways. Montesquieu seems to have assumed the
English practice of the judge giving firm guidance to the jury through
instructions on law and, even more importantly, comment on the
evidence.17 Tocqueville was more open in describing and praising this
practice. In Tocqueville’s view, judges should gently but authoritatively
guide jurors to a proper understanding of law and facts. According to
Tocqueville, the main point of jurors’ education in the “free school” for
democracy was to learn to defer to a more competent authority—the
judge.18
Along the way, I discuss Montesquieu’s influence on the American
founding. Both the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists drew on his work,
17. See infra Part I.E.
18. See infra Part II.B.
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but reached different conclusions about the need to constrain judges and
the role of the jury. The Anti-Federalists worried that the U.S. Constitution
provided no check on the federal judiciary. They thought that rights to jury
trial should be expanded so that the jury could serve as such a check. In
his response, Alexander Hamilton was especially Montesquieuian. He
commended juries, at least in criminal cases, but he advocated a judicial
power beyond what even Montesquieu may have thought advisable.19
I also shed new light on the antecedents of Tocqueville’s idea of the
jury as a school. With the advent of a modern democratic regime, the
education of large numbers of citizens in self-governance became critical.
Already before Tocqueville arrived, Americans were developing the
concept of the jury as a school. But Tocqueville made clearer the vital role
of the judge as teacher and guide.
At the end, I offer thoughts about whether Montesquieu and
Tocqueville were accurate in their belief in the potential of juries to mask
judicial power. I also briefly consider the question of whether the
considerable costs that the jury imposes on the legal system, in many ways,
are worth the benefit that Montesquieu and Tocqueville suggest. Both of
these authors anticipated this question. That is not surprising. They were
both judges, and they were both judges in an inquisitorial system, so able
to take a clearer view of the subject than a common-law judge. They did
not take juries for granted, nor did they try to justify the institution simply
because it existed, was old, and had been praised by others. Both of them
recognized and described many of the weaknesses of juries.
I. MONTESQUIEU ON JUDGES AND JURIES
A. Montesquieu’s Position as a Judge, His Stay in England, and Spirit of
the Laws
Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu
(1689–1755), became a high-ranking judge in ancien régime France in the
usual way: he inherited the job. When his uncle died in 1716, Montesquieu
inherited his title and judicial office in the Parlement of Bordeaux. The
French parlements were not, like the cognate English Parliament,
legislatures. Rather, they were judicial and administrative bodies. For the
next decade, Montesquieu presided over the Parlement of Bordeaux’s
criminal division. The criminal division heard appeals, supervised prisons,
and administered punishments.20 In thinking about Montesquieu’s work as
19. See infra Part II.D.1–2.
20. REBECCA KINGSTON, MONTESQUIEU AND THE PARLEMENT OF
BORDEAUX 219–71 (1996).
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an appellate judge, it is important to remember that appeals were and are
much more thorough in inquisitorial systems than in common-law
systems. Appeals in inquisitorial systems involve a thorough review of an
extensive written record and concern questions of fact as well as law. The
truncated appeals in common-law systems are the result of using lay
juries.21
Montesquieu’s interests turned to literary and intellectual life. In 1725,
he sold his judicial office, a common practice, and resigned from the
Parlement. He travelled to Italy, Germany, Austria, and other places,
finally ending up in England, where he lived for two years.22 The English
political system made an enormous impression on him. At the time,
England was developing a new constitution in the wake of the Glorious
Revolution of 1688 to 1689. Key features of that new constitution were
the supremacy of Parliament over royal prerogative and the independence
of judges. The Act of Settlement of 1701 ensured that English judges could
serve during their good behavior, not at the pleasure of the Crown.23
Afflicted by failing eyesight, Montesquieu returned to France and
began writing his culminating work Spirit of the Laws. He finally
published the book anonymously in 1748 in Geneva, where controls on
the press were less strict than in France. Even so, Montesquieu was careful
not to make his meaning too plain. A book openly singing the praises of
liberty would attract official ire. Often Montesquieu must be read between
the lines, in effect esoterically. Montesquieu essentially asked for an
esoteric reading of his book when he emphasized that the book must be
read as a whole.24 In the preface, he urged that his reader “not judge by a
moment’s reading the work of twenty years, that one approve or condemn
the book as a whole and not some few sentences.”25 He further explained
21. 1 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND 309, 568–69 (1883); John H. Langbein, Bifurcation and the Bench: The
Influence of the Jury on English Conceptions of the Judiciary, in JUDGES AND
JUDGING IN THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW: FROM
ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 67, 70 & n.17 (Paul Brand & Joshua Getzler eds.,
2012).
22. ROBERT SHACKLETON, MONTESQUIEU: A CRITICAL BIOGRAPHY 90–145
(1961).
23. 12 and 13 Will. 3 c. 2.
24. THOMAS L. PANGLE, MONTESQUIEU'S PHILOSOPHY OF LIBERALISM: A
COMMENTARY ON THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 11–19 (1989). As Nelson Lund put it,
anyone who tries to summarize Spirit of the Laws performs “a hazardous act of
distillation.” Nelson Lund, Montesquieu, Judicial Degeneracy, and the U.S.
Supreme Court, in NATURAL MORAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 285, 298
(Holger Zaborowski ed., 2010).
25. MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, supra note 2, at xliii (Preface).
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that “one must not always so exhaust a subject that one leaves nothing for
the reader to do,” and that he wanted the reader not just to read but to
“think.”26 Despite Montesquieu’s precautions, in 1751 the Vatican put
Spirit of the Laws on its Index of Forbidden Books. The eighteenth-century
censors at the Vatican understood his meaning well enough.
In Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu quietly sang the praises of liberty.
He thought that strenuous efforts to incorporate morality into law and
politics were themselves likely to lead to tyranny, as in Cromwell’s
England.27 Montesquieu was one of the major architects of the modern
project of lowering the aims of government—from justice and moral
excellence, as in the ancient polities, to contented self-preservation and
individual liberty.28
In his book, Montesquieu offered several different definitions of
liberty.29 Montesquieu might thereby have been suggesting that the
concept, and perhaps enjoyment, of liberty is elusive. Liberty may require
a certain tempering or moderation of the mind, even in formulating the
idea. In any event, at the beginning of his famous chapter on the
constitution of England, Montesquieu gave a definition of political liberty.
“Political liberty,” that most desired state of government, “is that
tranquility of spirit which comes from the opinion each one has of his
security, and in order for him to have this liberty the government must be
such that one citizen cannot fear another citizen.”30 No one person, or set
of persons, should dominate the others.
In the ancient and medieval world, it was hoped that justice, including
lack of oppression, would be achieved by the mixed regime.31 In this world
view, society was deeply divided between different classes: the few
(oligarchs or the aristocracy) and the many (the common people). In the
ruling institutions, it was necessary to provide separate representation for
each of the classes, and for each class to have a veto over the other.
Otherwise one class would oppress the other. An example of the mixed
26. Id. at 186 (bk. 11, ch. 20).
27. Id. at 75 n.2 (bk. 6, ch. 2).
28. Any striving for excellence should occur in the private sphere.
Montesquieu’s predecessors in the effort to lower the aims of government were
Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Locke. LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY
177–184, 226–34 (1953); Martin Diamond, The Separation of Powers and the
Mixed Regime, 8 PUBLIUS 33, 37–39 (1978).
29. MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, supra note 2, at 154–57 (bk. 11, chs.
1–6); id. at 188 (bk. 12, ch. 2); Lund, supra note 24, at 300–01.
30. MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, supra note 2, at 157 (bk. 11, ch. 6).
31. The differences between the ancient mixed regime and the modern
separation of powers are described in Diamond, supra note 28, at 34–39.
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regime was the English House of Lords and House of Commons. This was
not the modern separation of powers. Although they represented different
classes, the two houses of Parliament performed basically similar
functions. Montesquieu praised the English mixed regime, including a
hereditary nobility to oppose both a monarch’s pretensions to absolute rule
and the common people’s desire to confiscate property.32
But Montesquieu had something in mind beyond the old mixed
regime. It was not enough to divide the institutions of government by class.
He thought they should also be divided by function. This insight was so
influential in part because division by function could readily be applied to
a type of government that in theory had no privileged classes. That is, to
democracy. The modern separation of powers does not divide institutions
by classes, but by functions. Modern separation of powers is intended to
moderate the effects of a political equality of citizens.
With the lowering of the aims of government, political equality of
citizens became a possibility. The concern about democracy had always
been that the common people were inadequate to the job of politics. But
perhaps the people would be, or could become, capable enough to achieve
modest aims.33 As we have seen, one of these modest aims was individual
liberty. Such liberty would require limits on government power,
moderation. Therefore Montesquieu’s aim was to produce a moderate
government. “Political liberty is found only in moderate governments.”34
Forming a moderate government requires checks and balances,
including the separation of powers by function. As Montesquieu put it:
In order to form a moderate government, one must combine
powers, regulate them, temper them, make them act; one must
give one power a ballast, so to speak, to put it in a position to resist
another; this is a masterwork of legislation that chance rarely
produces and prudence is rarely allowed to produce.35

32. MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, supra note 2, at 160–61 (bk. 11, ch.
6). At least in theory, the two houses of Parliament represented different classes.
But in practice, this difference could be slight. Into the nineteenth century, the
English nobility had a large influence on the House of Commons, through “rotten
boroughs” and other patronage. And the interests of many of the landed gentry in
the House of Commons were hard to distinguish from the interests of the nobility.
33. Diamond, supra note 28, at 39.
34. MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, supra note 2, at 155 (bk. 11, ch. 4).
35. Id. at 63 (bk. 5, ch. 14).
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B. Professional Judges: The Key to Preserving Liberty
Montesquieu’s great innovation was adding the judiciary to the
legislature and executive to form a triumvirate of governmental power.
Hobbes gave the Leviathan all power; Locke divided sovereignty into the
legislative and executive, law-making and law-enforcing.36 For Locke,
judging fell under the executive. Montesquieu separated the power to
judge and raised it to be on par with the other powers.37 For liberty to exist,
Montesquieu wrote, the power of judging must be separate from the other
two powers: “If it were joined to legislative power, the power over the life
and liberty of the citizens would be arbitrary, for the judge would be the
legislator.”38 Similarly, “If it were joined to executive power, the judge
could have the force of an oppressor.”39
This third power, the judiciary, was supposed to focus on “civil law,”
that is, resolution of criminal and civil disputes that directly affect
individuals. The judiciary was not supposed to focus on “political law” or
public law.40 By focusing on individual disputes with an eye to liberty,
judges would be a moderating power that could help prevent tyranny.
Who were these judges supposed to be? A key quality was that they
be independent from the other two powers, and from anyone else. In
Montesquieu’s France, that independence was assured in a way that seems
odd to us today: many offices, including judicial offices, were treated as
property—inherited, bought, and sold. As we have seen, Montesquieu
inherited and sold his own judicial office. Montesquieu thought that that
practice suited a monarchy.41 In a monarchy such as France, he believed,
the system combined the best features of a hereditary nobility—its respect
for custom and desire for stability—with the energy of the newly rich, the
mercantile class.42 Treating offices as property would produce more
independence than having to curry favor with the monarch for an
appointment. But in a republic, Montesquieu suggested, officers should be
selected based on competence and virtue.43 In any case, in order for
36. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 364 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1689).
37. MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, supra note 2, at 156–57 (bk. 6, ch. 11).
38. Id. at 157.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 8 (bk. 1, ch. 3) (defining political law and civil law); id. at 157 (bk.
11, ch. 6) (noting how the judicial power “punishes crimes or judges disputes
between individuals”).
41. Id. at 70–71 (bk. 5, ch. 19).
42. Id. at 350–51 (bk. 20, ch. 22).
43. Id. at 70 (bk. 5, ch. 19) (quoting PLATO, THE REPUBLIC bk. 8 [551c]).
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Montesquieu’s scheme of separation of powers to function properly,
judges must be independent of the legislative and executive powers.
How were judges supposed to exercise this independent power? It was
imperative that judges decide cases according to law. Otherwise, a judge
would be a despot.44 Montesquieu gave his most thorough account of
professional judging in the context of monarchies. It seems likely that he
presented this discussion in that context because he suggested that, in
republics, the people did the real judging and professional judges had very
little discretion.45 This claim of lack of discretion in professional judges in
a republic could help to conceal the aristocratic character of the office and
its power. In monarchies, Montesquieu explained, judges followed the law
when it was precise. When the law was not precise, the judges sought its
spirit.46 This could be a delicate business. In deciding particular cases,
“judges assume the manner of arbitrators; they deliberate together, they
share their thoughts, they come to an agreement; one modifies his opinion
to make it like another’s; opinions with the least support are incorporated
into the two most widely held.”47
Such judicial deliberations were a collegial process and a learned one.
The collegiality, based on discussing cases in panels, moderated the
judges’ decisions. Tempering came from within the judiciary, with power
counteracting power, judge counteracting judge, just as, on a larger scale,
the three branches of government counteracted each other. Also, the
judges were supposed to be learned in the law and to follow it.
Montesquieu insisted that legal “decisions should be preserved; they
should be learned, so that one judges there today as one judged yesterday
and so that the citizens’ property and life are as secure and fixed as the
very constitution of the state.”48 Proper judging was necessary to liberty
and was a task for professionals, not amateurs.
C. Problems with Lay Juries
Immediately after his description of professional judging,
Montesquieu contrasted the entirely different process of lay judging—
judging by juries of the people. The first thing he pointed out was that any
44. On Blackstone’s similar concerns about judicial arbitrariness, and
exaggerated, even mendacious, claim about the certainty of law, see John H.
Langbein, Blackstone on Judging, in BLACKSTONE AND HIS COMMENTARIES:
BIOGRAPHY, LAW, HISTORY 65–68 (Wilfrid Prest ed., 2009).
45. MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, supra note 2, at 76 (bk. 6, ch. 3).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 72 (bk. 6, ch. 1).
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dispute decided by the people must be radically simplified. The “people
are not jurists; the modifications and temperings of arbiters are not for
them; they must be presented with a single object, a deed, and only one
deed, and they have only to see whether they should condemn, absolve, or
remand judgment.”49 (Unlike Roman juries, English criminal juries only
had the first two options.) Later in the book, Montesquieu even wrote
favorably of the use of juries by the Romans and English in civil cases.
But he attached a vital condition. Civil juries “decided only questions of
fact; for example, if a sum had been paid or not, if an action had been
committed or not.”50 Jurors were strictly confined. “But because questions
of right required a certain ability,” these questions were given to
professional judges in Roman practice.51 Professional judges decided not
only questions of law, but application of law to fact.
English common-law judges shared Montesquieu’s concerns about
adjudication by lay jurors. At every turn, the common law was shaped by
the need to simplify cases for the jury. This drastic simplification occurred
even if that meant sacrificing accuracy of adjudication, as some disputes
were unavoidably complicated. Early English judges required lawyers to
plead down to a single factual issue in dispute.52 Over time, this
requirement was slightly relaxed, but still, judges allowed only a few
factual issues to go to a jury at a time. Courts strictly limited joinder of
claims and joinder of parties. Remedies at common law became
increasingly limited to damages, which were easy to announce, rather than
specific performance.53 Any case more complicated was either truncated
to fit the jury’s need for simplicity, or else sent to a wholly different system
of adjudication, one that did not use juries: equity, in the Court of
Chancery.54
A second problem that Montesquieu identified early in his discussion
of lay jurors was bias. The people’s envy or passion could be so great that
miscarriages of justice occurred. In describing his concern for such
Id. at 76–77 (bk. 6, ch. 4).
Id. at 179 (bk. 11, ch. 18).
Id. at 180.
JOHN H. LANGBEIN, RENÉE LETTOW LERNER & BRUCE P. SMITH,
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 147–52, 253–56 (2009). Langbein, Bifurcation and the
Bench, supra note 21, at 71; J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL
HISTORY 76–78 (4th ed. 2002); S. F. C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
THE COMMON LAW 79 (2d ed. 1981).
53. Langbein, Bifurcation and the Bench, supra note 21, at 71–72.
54. LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 52, at 286–335; Langbein,
Bifurcation and the Bench, supra note 21, at 72–74.
49.
50.
51.
52.
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injustices, Montesquieu for the first time named Machiavelli. Machiavelli,
he wrote, attributed the loss of liberty in Florence to the fact that the people
as a body did not judge cases of high treason committed against them.55
Montesquieu disagreed with him. In Montesquieu’s view, liberty was
more likely to be lost by the people judging than by the people not judging.
“I would gladly adopt this great man’s maxim,” he explained, “but as in
these cases of treason, political interest forces civil interest, so to speak
(for it is always a drawback if the people themselves judge their offenses),
the laws must provide, as much as they can, for the security of individuals
in order to remedy this drawback.”56 Individuals needed protections from
biased lay jurors.
Montesquieu described several protections against miscarriages of
justice by the people’s biased decisions. The Romans allowed an accused
person to exile himself before the judgment. They also wanted to make the
goods of condemned men sacred so that the people could not confiscate
them. It was a good idea, Montesquieu thought, to slow down prominent
cases, in order to calm the people and allow them to judge with cool
heads.57
In Montesquieu’s view, one of the best remedies for jury error was a
new trial. The Athenian Solon, Montesquieu explained, “knew very well
how to curb the people’s abuses of their power when judging crimes.”58
Solon wanted to make the Areopagus, a court composed of those who had
held high office, an appellate body judging the criminal decisions of the
people. In Montesquieu’s description of Solon’s proposal, if the
Areopagus thought the people had made a mistake, either in falsely
acquitting or condemning, the Areopagus would send the case back to the
people. This procedure was similar to that of the new trial in civil cases,
so beloved of English judges for correcting jury error.59 Montesquieu
thought Solon’s procedure was “an admirable law” because it “subjected
the people to the censure of the magistracy they most respected and to their
own censure as well!”60 Like new trial, the procedure had the virtue of
simply handing the case to a jury again, thus seeming to preserve the
power of the people. Although Montesquieu did not mention this, new trial
was and is a very expensive and time-consuming remedy. And there is no
55. MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, supra note 2, at 77 n.7 (bk. 6, ch. 5)
(citing NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, DISCOURSES ON THE FIRST TEN BOOKS OF LIVY
(bk. 1, ch. 7)).
56. Id. at 77–78.
57. Id. at 78.
58. Id.
59. LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 52, at 439–50.
60. MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, supra note 2, at 78 (bk. 6, ch. 5).
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guaranty that a second jury, or a third, or a fourth, will reach an accurate
verdict.
Later in the book, after he had exposed the reader to the pitfalls of lay
juries, Montesquieu recommended taking certain criminal cases away
from the jury altogether. This was because of the people’s bias. In
recommending this change, Montesquieu clearly contradicted the practice
of ancient republics and democracies, as well as Machiavelli’s opinion.
“Important men are always exposed to envy; and if they were judged by
the people, they could be endangered and would not enjoy the privilege of
the last citizen of a free state, of being judged by his peers.”61 Therefore
Montesquieu commended the English practice of trying a nobleman not
by an ordinary jury, but by his peers in the House of Lords.62
Again and again, Montesquieu emphasized that the people must not
play a direct role in government. He completely rejected popular
referenda, a power that “altogether exceeds the people’s capacity.” “The
people should not enter government except to choose their
representatives.”63 A representative republic had a great advantage over
the ancient democracies, in which the people had “an immediate power,”
because the people were so susceptible to demagogues. For, “when the
orators agitated them, these agitations always had their effect.”64 Orators
could have an effect on small groups of the people as well as large ones.
Nineteenth-century American judges lamented the susceptibility of juries
to being led astray by powerful advocates.65
D. Advantages of Lay Juries
With all of these problems of incompetence and bias, what was a
popular jury actually good for?
Montesquieu did recommend the institution. In fact, he claimed that,
in England, the jurors were judges. And England was “the one nation in
the world that has political liberty for its direct purpose.”66 In
Montesquieu’s view, England was really a republic masquerading as a
monarchy. In the beginning of his chapter titled, “On the constitution of
61. Id. at 163 (bk. 11, ch. 6).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 160; see also id. at 159 (“The great advantage of representatives is
that they are able to discuss public business. The people are not at all appropriate
for such discussions; this forms one of the great drawbacks of democracy.”).
64. Id. at 326 (bk. 19, ch. 27).
65. Renée Lettow Lerner, The Transformation of the American Civil Trial:
The Silent Judge, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 195, 213 (2000).
66. MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, supra note 2, at 156 (bk. 11, ch. 5).
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England,” he set out the tripartite division of power into legislative,
executive, and judicial. Soon after, he wrote, “The power of judging
should not be given to a permanent senate but should be exercised by
persons drawn from the body of the people at certain times of the year in
the manner prescribed by law to form a tribunal which lasts only as long
as necessity requires.”67
The next two sentences explain the seemingly odd recommendation to
give the power of judging to laypersons: “In this fashion, the power of
judging, so terrible among men, being attached neither to a certain state
[status, such as nobility] nor to a certain profession, becomes, so to speak,
invisible and null. Judges are not continually in view; one fears the
magistracy, not the magistrates.”68 Just in case the reader missed it the first
time, Montesquieu repeated a few pages later: “Among the three powers
of which we have spoken, that of judging is in some fashion, null.”69
“So to speak.” “In some fashion.” Montesquieu was inviting us to read
between the lines. He had already described the importance of professional
judges’ deliberations and judgments in preserving liberty. His very
elevation of the judiciary to a separate power on par with the legislative
and executive indicates the judiciary’s importance. The power of the
judiciary is key to his whole constitutional scheme of liberty and
moderation. It is not null.
But it may be made “invisible,” or at least disguised. As Montesquieu
pointed out, the power of judging is indeed “terrible among men.” It is a
great responsibility to apply the law directly to an individual, to pronounce
a civil litigant liable or a criminal defendant guilty, or the reverse, and to
decree a particular amount of damages or a sentence. Such a power may
well produce internal anxiety and attract external criticism and anger.
Many judges would just as soon be relieved of that responsibility. Exercise
of this power could eventually attract the jealousy and wrath of the people
and the curtailing of judges’ moderating power. Perhaps that is one reason
why Montesquieu continually warns against lay juries—the people—
judging the powerful. Those powerful persons could include judges.
Use of lay juries deflects attention from the judges. Judges can claim
that they had no responsibility for the outcome—it was the work of the
people themselves. The lay jurors do the dirty work of deciding the facts
and pronouncing the verdict, not the judge. The jurors get the
responsibility and thus the blame. Not only that, but jurors may help
67. Id. at 158 (bk. 11, ch. 6).
68. Id. In a footnote to this passage, Montesquieu clarified that he meant use
of jurors, as in the English practice. Id. at 158 n.a.
69. Id. at 160.
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conceal the enormous role that common-law judges play in developing the
law.
Montesquieu went so far as to write that jurors are really “judges,”
because “they make the judgments.”70 The real judges are thus able to hide
behind the mask of the “judges” from the people.
Professional judges are often reluctant to admit that they are glad that
juries spare them the hard work and responsibility of judging. Judges
praise juries for many other reasons, but almost never for the one that lies
closest to their interests. Only rarely is a judge capable of discussing the
subject with some candor. A striking example is Sir James Fitzjames
Stephen, the late-nineteenth-century English High Court judge and
criminologist. At the end of the first volume of his History of the Criminal
Law of England, Stephen devoted a chapter to comparing French and
English criminal justice.71 As with earlier English legal writers, knowledge
of the French system provoked Stephen to explain and justify his own
system.72
Like Montesquieu, Stephen was quite open about the drawbacks of
ordinary jurors. Stephen discussed their lack of intelligence and resulting
confusion, bias, absence of legal training and knowledge, failure to pay
attention to evidence, inability to give reasons for their decisions with
resulting harm to appeal, and want of individual responsibility.73
And yet, like Montesquieu, Stephen claimed that the jury was
valuable. Not only did juries help to legitimize criminal judgments in the
eyes of the people, but there was another reason. Stephen broached the
70. Id. at 158.
71. 1 STEPHEN, supra note 21, at 504–76.
72. Sir John Fortescue (c.1395–c.1477), author of De Laudibus Legum
Angliae, and Sir Thomas Smith (1513–1577), author of De Republica Anglorum,
were both inspired to write their books describing the English legal system by
spending time in France. Fortescue was in political exile; Smith was a diplomat.
See LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 52, at 155–56, 589–92.
73. 1 STEPHEN, supra note 21, at 560 (“Many of the jury are men of little
intelligence, and apt to follow any lead.”); id. at 561 (jurors lack individual
responsibility and legal training); id. at 562 (a decision by a jury “is often founded
on mistaken grounds, and is sometimes a compromise”); id. at 568–69 (jurors lack
individual responsibility, give no reasons for their decisions, are not subject to
appeal, and can exhibit “strong prejudice”); id. at 571 (during trial, “it continually
happens that several [of the jurors] are half asleep, or listen mechanically, or think
about something else, and that when the verdict is considered they follow the lead
of any member of the jury who chooses to take the lead”); id. at 572 (“I strongly
suspect that a large proportion of [jurors] would, if examined openly at the end of
a trial as to the different matters which they had heard in the course of it, be found
to be in a state of hopeless confusion and bewilderment.”).
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topic with some hesitation. He admitted that he was, “as every judge must
be, a prejudiced witness on the subject.”74 After these warnings, he
plunged in:
It is hardly necessary to say that to judges in general the
maintenance of trial by jury is of more importance than to any
other members of the community [presumably including criminal
defendants]. It saves judges from the responsibility—which to
many men would appear intolerably heavy and painful—of
deciding simply on their own opinion upon the guilt or innocence
of the prisoner.75
The nominally independent decision of the jury spared the judge both the
internal pressure of making the decision entirely himself, and the external
criticism that that decision might attract. He then pointed out that the judge
acted as a guide and advisor to the jury through judicial comment on
evidence. Stephen completely agreed with Montesquieu that juries
deflected attention and responsibility from judges.
Montesquieu recommended that the jury system be tweaked to
enhance the public perception of justice and to further disguise judicial
power. The litigants themselves should play a role in selecting the jurors.
In important criminal cases, Montesquieu wrote, “the criminal in
cooperation with the law must choose the judges,” that is, the jurors. Here
again, perception was more important than reality. “[O]r at least he must
be able to challenge so many of them that those who remain are considered
to be of his choice.”76 Montesquieu did not describe the practice of
challenges to jurors as a protection for the accused. The purpose was to
hide the exercise of power under a veneer of choice.
From the beginning of the institution in England in the thirteenth
century, the use of the criminal jury was proclaimed to be by the
defendant’s choice. This was a highly coerced choice; if the defendant
refused, he would be pressed to death by piling rocks on his chest. The
legal term for this procedure was peine forte et dure—“strong and harsh
punishment.” Under the circumstances, few defendants objected to jury
74. Id. at 573.
75. Id.
76. MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, supra note 2, at 158 (bk.11, ch. 6).
Montesquieu goes so far as to say that jurors should be of the same “condition”
as the accused, his peers in terms of class and status, “so that he does not suppose
that he has fallen into the hands of people inclined to do him violence.” Id. at 158–
59. Here Montesquieu is considering the jury from the class-based perspective of
the mixed regime. That was appropriate for eighteenth-century England, with its
deep class divides.
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trial. Still, every criminal defendant was ritually asked the question, “How
wilt thou be tried?” and he was supposed to answer, “By God and by my
country,” that is, by jury.77
Not only was the institution of the jury supposedly used by the
defendant’s choice, but the defendant supposedly had a large say in
choosing the individual jurors. Blackstone praised “the extreme
tenderness” of the English common law toward the accused, who at that
time in felony cases was allowed 20 peremptory challenges to jurors.78
What Blackstone did not mention was that the defendant hardly ever
exercised any of these challenges, as he was allowed no voir dire.79 This
was part of what made eighteenth-century English jury trial so speedy. If
English defendants had regularly exercised these challenges, or anything
approaching that number, the jury system would have collapsed from lack
of jurors.80 Apparently Blackstone agreed with Montesquieu that the
perception of “tenderness” was more important than the reality.
Later in the book, Montesquieu addressed the question of jurors in
civil cases. He commented that, among the Romans, it was “very favorable
to liberty” that the officials in charge of the civil justice system selected
the jurors with the consent of both parties. In his view, the many objections
that civil litigants in England could make to jurors was the functional
equivalent of choosing jurors by consent of the parties.81 In England,
therefore, litigants could choose their own judges. Or at least appear to do
so.
E. English Judges’ Control over Juries
If lay jurors really were the judges in fact and not just in name, this
would be a disaster for liberty. We have seen that Montesquieu
emphasized the shortcomings of lay jurors and the importance of
professional judges. While hiding behind the mask of lay jurors, the
professional judges must be firmly in charge.
77. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF: EUROPE AND
ENGLAND IN THE ANCIEN RÉGIME 75–76 (1977); LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH,
supra note 52, at 61–62.
78. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *353.
79. LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 52, at 594–95; John H.
Langbein, The English Criminal Jury Trial on the Eve of the French Revolution,
in JURY TRIAL IN ENGLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY 1700-1900 13, 28–29 (A. Padoa
Schioppa ed., 1987).
80. J. M. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND 1660-1800 340,
390–94 (1986).
81. MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, supra note 2, at 179 (bk. 11, ch. 18).
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Montesquieu himself gave few clues about how professional judges
were to enforce their control. As was well-known, English judges had
considerable power to declare the law. But this power would be useless if
juries could nullify the law through perverse findings of fact or
applications of law to fact. English judges had many ways to prevent this.
One way to solve the problem was to take cases away from the jury
altogether. For example, in civil cases the pleading process mentioned
earlier sometimes resulted in no issues of fact for the jury, only questions
of law. In that case, the English judges decided the law, which resolved
the case. And English judges steadily expanded the law to embrace
questions that had formerly been issues of fact.82 The judges also
encouraged rules channeling evidence into written instruments, such as the
Statute of Frauds of 1677.83 The act was largely designed by Matthew
Hale, Chief Justice of King’s Bench, and had the effect of removing
certain cases from the jury when there was no written instrument.84
If jury trial did occur, English judges still had many powers. In
England at the time, as Montesquieu may have known, the professional
judges could and often did dominate juries. Judges mainly did this through
what we would now call “instructions to the jury.” Back then (and even
now), an English judge’s instructions looked quite different from the
modern American practice of a dry, tedious, almost incomprehensible, and
fact-free recitation of appellate-approved boilerplate. In both criminal and
civil cases, an English judge could comment extensively on the evidence,
and often gave the jury his opinion about how the case should come out.85
Jurors were ordinarily eager to follow the judge’s views.86
82. Langbein, Bifurcation and the Bench, supra note 21, at 79; A. W. B.
Simpson, The Horowitz Thesis and the History of Contracts, 46 U. CHI. L. REV.
533, 600 (1979); J. H. Baker, Book review of Patrick Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of
Freedom of Contract (1979), 43 M.L.R. 467, 469 (1980); LANGBEIN, LERNER &
SMITH, supra note 52, at 448–50.
83. 29 Car. 2 c. 3 (1677).
84. Through the legal incentives to landowners in the act, Hale also created
the functional equivalent of a land registration system in England. The shrewd
English judge killed two troublesome legal birds with one legislative stone. See
Philip Hamburger, The Conveyancing Purposes of the Statute of Frauds, 27 AM.
J. LEGAL HIST. 354, 364–73 (1983).
85. LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 52, at 431–33; Langbein,
Bifurcation and the Bench, supra note 21, at 77–78; John H. Langbein, Historical
Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A View from the Ryder Sources, 96 COLUM.
L. REV. 1168, 1191–93 (1996); John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the
Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 285–87 (1978).
86. Langbein, Blackstone on Judging, supra note 44, at 70–71.
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Should the jury nevertheless bring in a verdict against his advice, the
judge could ask the jury for their reasons for a verdict, discuss with the
jury their reasons, refuse to record a verdict, and require re-deliberation.87
In criminal cases, judges also in effect wielded a pardon power. The
Crown almost never refused a judge’s recommendation for clemency.88 In
civil cases there was the remedy of new trial, discussed above.89 In
addition, for civil cases there was the backstop of Chancery, a court which
sat without juries.90
The only type of case in which English juries were apt to be resistant
to this immense judicial control was what Lord Mansfield called “political
cases.”91 These were mainly cases involving laws about religious
conformity and seditious libel, or what we would call today “free exercise
of religion” and “free speech.” Under modern political theory, these kinds
of liberties are at the core of the modest aims of government. In these types
of cases, English juries sometimes nullified the law. For example, in 1670
an English jury acquitted William Penn, the founder of Pennsylvania, and
William Mead of charges of illegally participating in a Quaker assembly.92
There could be no doubt of Penn and Mead’s guilt. They both openly
preached Quakerism. Likewise, English juries sometimes acquitted
defendants of charges of seditious libel, although it was obvious that these
defendants had illegally criticized the government.93
From a Montesquieuian perspective, the reaction of English judges to
this kind of jury nullification was brilliant. English judges decided to
maintain and even enhance the nominal power of juries. That way, judges
could quietly promote liberty, if they chose, and, in any event, avoid
political trouble.
The seminal decision was the opinion of John Vaughan, Chief Justice
of Common Pleas, in 1670 in Bushell’s Case.94 Bushell’s Case stemmed
directly from the case against Penn and Mead. After the jury acquitted
Penn and Mead “contrary to the full and manifest evidence,” as the trial
judge put it, and against his instructions, the trial judge fined the jurors. At
87. LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 52, at 433–38. This post-verdict
interaction with the jury became less frequent over time.
88. Id. at 430, 626–28.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 58–60.
90. See sources cited supra note 54.
91. 1 JAMES OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS AND THE GROWTH OF
ENGLISH LAW IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 206 n.44 (1992).
92. R. v. Penn & Mead, 6 St. Tr. 951 (O.B. 1670). See CRAIG W. HORLE, THE
QUAKERS AND THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM: 1660-1688 116–17 (1988).
93. LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 52, at 430.
94. Bushell’s Case, Vaughan 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670).
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the time, this was a recognized remedy for juror misconduct. Eight of the
12 jurors refused to pay the fine, and were imprisoned. Again, this was a
recognized remedy. These jurors, including Edward Bushell, got a writ of
habeas corpus from the court of Common Pleas, challenging the legality
of their imprisonment. Chief Justice Vaughan gave an opinion declaring
that jurors could not be fined for disobeying the trial judge’s instructions.95
In the opinion in Bushell’s Case, Vaughan achieved his objective of
giving nominal independence to jurors. He therefore got English judges
out of the politically-charged business of making individual
determinations on liberties, at least formally.96 Judges could claim that if
juries wanted to nullify the law in certain cases, that was the jurors’
business and not the judges’ fault. Rather than outright declaring
substantive liberties, the English left these liberties to a procedural
mechanism, the jury. English judges were willing to give up the formal
power to fine and imprison jurors because they had so many other means
of jury control.
Unfortunately, Montesquieu’s travel journals for his stay in England
were either lost or destroyed, so we do not know precisely how much he
was aware of English legal practice. We do know that after he returned to
France, he kept up a correspondence with Charles Yorke, the son of the
Lord Chancellor and later Lord Chancellor himself.97 So Montesquieu was
familiar, at least, with the Court of Chancery and the practice of equity,
and probably other features of the legal system as well. The likelihood is
that he was aware that English judges dominated the jury. Such an
awareness would have strengthened his belief that the jury could serve as
a mask for the true judicial power: that of professional judges. Hiding
behind the jury, judges could quietly continue to promote liberty and to
serve as a moderating influence.

95. Vaughan’s opinion is disingenuous, and attacks a series of straw men. See
LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 52, at 429, 431.
96. The issue of judges fining and imprisoning jurors was politically salient
at the time Vaughan declared his opinion. A few years earlier, John Kelyng, Chief
Justice of King’s Bench, had almost been impeached for fining and imprisoning
jurors. THOMAS A. GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE 213 (1985). In
1668, Vaughan was a member of Parliament and chairman of a committee
considering draft legislation to prohibit fining and imprisoning jurors. Shortly
after, he was appointed to the bench. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the
Lawyers, supra note 85, at 300 n.108.
97. CARRESE, THE CLOAKING OF POWER, supra note 15, at 27; SHACKLETON,
supra note 22, at 278, 287, 383–84.
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F. Montesquieu among the American Founders: The Anti-Federalists
and Hamilton on Judges and Juries
Montesquieu’s ideas were enormously influential among the
American founders. Under Montesquieu’s influence, the framers of the
U.S. Constitution developed the tripartite division of power among the
legislature, executive, and judiciary.
Raising the federal judicial power to the level of the legislative and
executive, however, provoked serious concern and objection. As
Montesquieu might have foreseen, the draft of the U.S. Constitution sent
to the states for ratification triggered fears about an overweening power in
federal judges. According to the draft, federal judges had life tenure and
salary protection, and did not have to face election and re-election. This
was a wonderful Montesquieuian recipe for independence. But it also
meant that there was little control over the power of judges, so far as that
power extended.
Added to this judicial independence was a potentially tremendous new
power. Recall that Montesquieu had urged that judges confine themselves
to deciding private disputes, those involving individuals. He pointedly
recommended that judges not get involved in “political law,” or disputes
over public law.98 Such disputes could attract too much criticism, and in
the end lead to a curtailing of judges’ power, with its promotion of liberty
and moderation. England had found a way of controlling judges’ power.
Following the Glorious Revolution, English judges achieved full
independence. They got life tenure and eventually salary protection. But
there was a major limitation on English judges’ power: Parliament was
supreme. Parliament—not a court composed wholly of professional
judges—was the highest court in the land. Therefore English judges had
no power to void an act of Parliament. As American lawyers would put it,
as to acts of Parliament, English judges had no power of judicial review.
The situation under the draft of the U.S. Constitution was far different.
Although the U.S. Constitution nowhere explicitly states that judges had
the power to void acts of Congress and actions of the executive, that power
was implied. It was well understood that a higher law trumped a lower. In
England, for example, judges routinely held that an act of Parliament
voided a contrary municipal regulation. The U.S. Constitution was clearly
a higher law than an act of Congress. Judges had a duty to interpret and
apply the law. Therefore it was widely understood that, under the U.S.
Constitution, judges could and should void contrary acts of the legislature

98. See infra Part II.B.
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and actions of the executive.99 Judges were the ones who would police the
boundaries between the separate powers of the federal government.100 Not
only that, but judges would also police the boundary between the federal
government and the states. Against Montesquieu’s advice, American
judges were enlisted to decide cases of “political law.” The framers of the
U.S. Constitution had taken Montesquieu’s recommendation for more
judicial power and raised it to an even greater level. That level was quite
possibly injudicious and immoderate. No other nation had given
independent professional judges such power.101
This independence and power of review, united in the federal
judiciary, understandably frightened some Americans. The AntiFederalists, like the Federalists, had read Montesquieu and celebrated his
idea of checks on power.102 But they saw no checks on the federal
judiciary. Anti-Federalists predicted that federal judges would become
tyrannical. The Federal Farmer warned that “we are more in danger of
sowing the seeds of arbitrary government in this department than in any
99. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY (2008); Bradford R.
Clark, The Supremacy Clause as a Constraint on Federal Power, 71 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 91 (2003) (arguing that the founders understood the Supremacy Clause to
authorize judicial review); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 403–05 (Alexander
Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001). In August 1786,
future U.S. Supreme Court justice James Iredell published perhaps the first
defense of judicial review in America, based on the Constitution of North
Carolina. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Elusive Foundation: John Marshall, James
Wilson, and the Problem of Reconciling Popular Sovereignty and Natural Law
Jurisprudence in the New Federal Republic, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 113, 131–32
(2003).
100. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 99, at 403–05.
101. But state judges were already engaging in judicial review under the state
constitutions. See HAMBURGER, supra note 99; Wilmarth, supra note 99, at 131–
32.
102. See, e.g., The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the
Convention of Pennsylvania to Their Constituents (18 Dec. 1787), reprinted in 3
THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 161–62 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (3.11.44)
(quoting MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, supra note 2 (bk. 11, ch. 6));
FEDERAL FARMER, ESSAY VII (31 Dec. 1787), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra, at 266–67 (2.8.97) (quoting MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF
THE LAWS, supra note 2 (bk. 11, ch. 6)); BRUTUS, ESSAY III (15 Nov. 1787),
reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra, at 378 (2.9.39) (quoting
MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, supra note 2 (bk. 11, ch. 6)). On the
importance of the Anti-Federalists’ arguments, particularly in generating
amendments to the Constitution, see Paul Finkelman, Antifederalists: The Loyal
Opposition and the American Constitution, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 182, 190–202
(1984) (reviewing THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra).
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other.”103 Of the Anti-Federalists, Brutus was the most far-sighted in his
critique of the provisions for the federal judiciary. He pointed out that the
judges of the U.S. Supreme Court were to be totally independent, and yet
to have vast power. “I question whether the world ever saw, in any period
of it, a court of justice invested with such immense powers, and yet placed
in a situation so little responsible.”104 Certainly this combination was
“altogether unprecedented in a free country.”105 Brutus observed that the
federal judges would have the power of judicial review over acts of
Congress, and also over state legislatures. The U.S. Supreme Court’s
natural tendency would be to enlarge the permitted scope of federal
legislation—and its own power. The judges could adopt any method of
reasoning, or unreasoning, they liked.106
Unlike in England, where Parliament was supreme and the House of
Commons faced elections, there would be no control on the decisions of
the U.S. Supreme Court.107 Impeachment could be used only for treason,
bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors, not for wrong
decisions.108 The Constitution contained no check on the arbitrariness of
the judges of the U.S. Supreme Court. “In short, they are independent of
the people, of the legislature, and of every power under heaven. Men
placed in this situation will generally soon feel themselves independent of
heaven itself.”109 There would be no remedy for this judicial tyranny but
forcible rebellion: “with a high hand and an outstretched arm.”110
This fear of unprecedented power in federal judges helps to explain
the Anti-Federalists’ insistence on the need for jury trial in federal court.
They viewed the division of the court between judge and jury as similar to
bicameralism in the legislature. Jury trial would provide some way to
control the decisions of the professional judges. Otherwise, there would
be none.
103. FEDERAL FARMER, ESSAY XV (18 Jan. 1788), reprinted in 2 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 102, at 316 (2.8.185).
104. BRUTUS, ESSAY XV (20 Mar. 1788), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST, supra note 102, at 438 (2.9.186).
105. BRUTUS, ESSAY XI (31 Jan. 1788), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST, supra note 102, at 418 (2.9.130).
106. Id. at 419–22 (2.9.136–44); BRUTUS, ESSAY XII (7 Feb. 1788), reprinted
in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 422–25 (2.9.145–52); id. at 426–28
(2.9.153–58).
107. BRUTUS, ESSAY XV, supra note 104, at 438 (2.9.188).
108. BRUTUS, ESSAY XI, supra note 105, at 418 (2.9.131); BRUTUS, ESSAY
XV, supra note 104, at 439–40 (2.9.192); see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
109. BRUTUS, ESSAY XV, supra note 104, at 438 (2.9.189).
110. Id. at 442 (2.9.196).
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The Anti-Federalists generally did not invoke the old mixed-regime
argument about the class bias of judges and the need to counter that class
with representation of another class, the common people.111 As we will
see, that was Blackstone’s main justification for the jury.112 Instead, most
Anti-Federalists made an argument based on the modern separation of
powers. According to that argument, all citizens had political equality, and
power should be divided based not on class but rather function.113 In the
case of courts, the Anti-Federalists explained, judges were supposed to
decide the law and the jury the facts.
But the line between fact and law was murky and shifting. We have
seen that common-law judges steadily expanded the scope of law at the
expense of fact.114 Because fact and law could be blended together in a
way difficult to separate, Anti-Federalists emphasized the importance of
the jury being allowed to give a general verdict in civil cases, as opposed
to special verdicts that more strictly confined juries.115
Lurking behind this question of the general verdict was the question
of the jury’s ability to decide the law, or to nullify. In the years leading up
to the American Revolution, Americans had celebrated juries’
nullification of unpopular British laws.116 American colonists had no
111. A (Maryland) Farmer came close to making the class-based mixedregime argument for the jury, but even he made it mainly in the context of
England. A (MARYLAND) FARMER, ESSAY IV (21 Mar. 1788), reprinted in 5 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 102, at 38 (5.1.64). The Federal Farmer,
in his Essay IV, suggested the old mixed-regime rationale. Trial by jury, he wrote,
“is essential in every free country, that common people should have a part and
share of influence, in the judicial as well as in the legislative department.”
FEDERAL FARMER, ESSAY IV (12 Oct. 1787), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST, supra note 102, at 249–50 (2.8.54–55). In Essay VII, the Federal
Farmer emphasized the importance of representation of different classes in the
legislature, which he hoped to achieve by increased numbers of representatives.
FEDERAL FARMER, ESSAY VII, supra note 102, at 265–69 (2.8.97–99). But then
in Essay XV he adopted the framework of the modern separation of powers, with
division of functions. See FEDERAL FARMER, ESSAY XV, supra note 103, at 316–
23 (2.8.185–95).
112. See infra text accompanying note 187.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 31–34.
114. See supra text accompanying note 82. On this development in the United
States, see AMALIA D. KESSLER, INVENTING AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: THE
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN ADVERSARIAL LEGAL CULTURE, 1800–1877 168 n.69
(2017).
115. See, e.g., FEDERAL FARMER, ESSAY XV, supra note 103, at 319–20
(2.8.190); A (MARYLAND) FARMER, ESSAY IV, supra note 111, at 38–39 (5.1.66).
116. LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 52, at 475–85.
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representation in the British Parliament, and colonial judges served at the
pleasure of royal governors. Juries were therefore one of the only ways
that colonial Americans, the people, had a voice in government.
But with the advent of the new republic, the political situation of the
people was much different. This was presumably one of the reasons why
Anti-Federalists almost never argued openly for the jury’s ability to decide
the law, or jury nullification. They hardly ever referred to jury
nullification, including the celebrated cases during the run-up to the
Revolution. Jury nullification seemed inappropriate in a modern
democratic republic, with representation of the people and separation of
powers. It certainly violated the idea of the division of functions between
the judge and jury.
Properly limited to questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and
law, the jury was necessary as a check on judges. And the jury’s power,
even its existence, appeared doubtful under the new constitution. AntiFederalists worried that there was no guaranty of civil jury trial in the U.S.
Constitution.117 They were almost equally concerned that the U.S.
Supreme Court was to be given appellate jurisdiction as to both law and
fact.118 The latter provision appeared to contradict the common-law
principle that the factual findings of a jury were not subject to appeal.119
The pamphlets of Brutus, the Federal Farmer, and other AntiFederalists were widely read and popular at the time the state ratifying
conventions were elected and debating the provisions of the draft U.S.
Constitution.120 In order for the plan to be ratified, supporters of the draft
constitution had to find a way to assuage these fears.
117. See, e.g., FEDERAL FARMER, ESSAY XV, supra note 103, at 321–22
(2.8.193). A (Maryland) Farmer admitted that there was “some truth” to the
allegations that jurors in civil cases were “too ignorant—that they cannot
distinguish between right and wrong—that decisions on property are submitted to
chance; and that the last word, commonly determines the cause.” He tried to
relieve such concerns by claiming that jurors would rise to the occasion if given
a chance. “Give them power and they will find the understanding to use it.” In any
event, he argued that civil juries were an “important check to judiciary
usurpation.” A (MARYLAND) FARMER, ESSAY IV, supra note 111, at 39 (5.1.67).
118. BRUTUS, ESSAY XIV (28 Feb. 1788), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST, supra note 102, at 431–33 (2.9.169–75); id. (6 Mar. 1788) (2.9.176–
85); FEDERAL FARMER XV, supra note 103, at 319 (2.8.189); see U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 2.
119. FEDERAL FARMER XV, supra note 103, at 322 (2.8.194).
120. Herbert J. Storing, Notes on Observations of The Federal Farmer, in 2
THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 102, at 214; Herbert J. Storing,
Notes on Essays of Brutus, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note
102, at 358.
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What better way to do that than to turn to Montesquieu again? Judges’
enormous power could be masked. Well-versed in Montesquieuian tactics,
Alexander Hamilton took on the task. His essays in The Federalist
numbers 78 through 83 are a direct response to Brutus’s critique of the
federal judiciary.121 Hamilton’s essays rigorously and analytically defend
the provisions of the draft U.S. Constitution concerning judicial
independence and the precise grants of jurisdiction to federal courts in
Article III, as well as the implication of judicial review. And yet, in
important respects, Hamilton’s essays are a lullaby addressed to
Americans crying out against excessive judicial power.
Hamilton quickly revealed the source of his inspiration. In his first
essay on the judiciary, in The Federalist number 78, he announced that
“the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments
of power.”122 He dropped a footnote to that statement: “The celebrated
Montesquieu, speaking of [the judges] says, ‘of the three powers above
mentioned, the JUDICIARY is next to nothing.’ Spirit of Laws, vol. 1, page
186.”123
Again, following Montesquieu, one of Hamilton’s soothing arguments
was that judges would follow the law and precedent, and not be selfwilled.124 This argument echoed passages in Spirit of the Laws in which
Montesquieu implied that, in a republic, judges had no discretion in
determining the law, and simply followed it mechanically.125 (As we have
seen, in other passages Montesquieu made clear that judges did in fact
have discretion in shaping and applying law.126)
Hamilton devoted his very last and longest essay on the judiciary to
trial by jury. In The Federalist number 83, Hamilton was at his most
121. Wilmarth, supra note 99, at 139–42.
122. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 99, at 402. Just before this statement,
Hamilton argued that in a system of separation of powers, “the judiciary, from the
nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of
the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them.”
Id.
123. Id. at n.*. Hamilton omitted the words “in some measure” from his
quotation of Montesquieu. The translation Hamilton used reads: “Of the three
powers above mentioned, the judiciary is in some measure next to nothing.”
Hamilton also failed to mention that, in the context of that statement, Montesquieu
was referring to English juries as judges. These omissions were almost certainly
deliberate, as Hamilton was a careful reader of Montesquieu. See Nelson Lund,
Judicial Review and Judicial Duty: The Original Understanding, 26 CONST.
COMMENT. 169, 180 n.21 (2009) (book review of HAMBURGER, supra note 99).
124. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 99, at 405, 407.
125. See supra text accompanying note 45.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 46–48.
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reassuring. At least, he was reassuring as to the need for the jury in
criminal cases. But sustained reading reveals Hamilton’s grave misgivings
about the civil jury. Ever since, supporters of the jury have downplayed
his criticisms. Like his predecessor Montesquieu, Hamilton saw serious
drawbacks to adjudication by lay jurors.
Hamilton opened his essay on the jury by explaining that the most
successful objection to the draft U.S. Constitution was the lack of a
guarantee of jury trial in civil cases.127 This was a remarkable admission,
and suggests the depth of concern about a tyrannical federal judiciary.
Criminal jury trial was guaranteed in Article III, section 2 of the draft U.S.
Constitution, but the draft included no right to civil jury trial. Hamilton
protested that silence did not mean abolition.128
Hamilton’s next move was to lavish praise on jury trial while
emphasizing agreement between Federalists and Anti-Federalists. “The
friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if they agree in
nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by
jury . . . .” The only difference between them was that “the former regard
it as a valuable safeguard to liberty,” while “the latter represent it as the
very palladium of free government.”129 This is the language that American
lawyers and judges have quoted ever since. They ignore the rest of the
essay, in which Hamilton made quite a different point.
Having emphasized this harmonious unity about jury trial in the
beginning of a paragraph, in the middle of that paragraph Hamilton
suddenly pivoted. He injected the critical word “but.” “But I must
acknowledge, that I cannot readily discern the inseparable connection
between the existence of liberty, and the trial by jury, in civil cases.”130
Criminal jury trial prevented tyranny, but civil jury trial was a different
matter.
Hamilton spent the rest of the essay, the considerable majority of the
longest essay he wrote on the judiciary, attacking civil jury trial. He also
explained why it would be extraordinarily difficult to draft a right to civil
jury trial for the federal constitution. His criticisms of the civil jury deserve
close attention, which I cannot give here but plan to in future writing. For
this Article, it is enough to point out that his two main criticisms of lay
adjudication in civil cases agree with criticisms that Montesquieu made.
First, jury trial requires radical simplification of a dispute: “the matter to
127. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 430 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey
& James McClellan eds., 2001).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 432–33.
130. Id. at 433.
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be decided should be reduced to some single and obvious point.”131 This
made civil jury trial ineligible for many cases, which required more
complicated adjudication. Second, jurors were not learned in the law and
therefore were not able to handle critical cases turning on, for example,
the law of nations.132 Under this latter objection lay the fear of jury bias,
especially bias against foreigners. Such bias had been well-demonstrated
in states that had allowed maritime and admiralty prize cases to go to
juries.133 The results in those cases threatened to upset the crucial foreign
relations of the fledgling republic.
The best—indeed, almost the only—reason Hamilton saw for civil
jury trial depended on a circumstance that he described as “foreign to the
preservation of liberty.”134 That was corruption in the judiciary. In
Hamilton’s view, civil jury trial did not have many virtues in itself, but it
could check corrupt judges, if absolutely necessary, as a second-best
measure. Hamilton implied that the evil of corrupt judges should be
addressed at its source. As we will see in the conclusion of this Article, the
problem of corrupt judges is significant today.
Hamilton, like Montesquieu before him, advocated for a strong
judiciary but tried to mask its powers. Also like Montesquieu, he endorsed
jury trial, which had the happy effect of deflecting attention from judges.
But the drawbacks that he and Montesquieu saw in lay adjudication
suggested significant limitations on the scope of jury trial, especially civil
jury trial. Four decades later, another follower of Montesquieu was to
analyze the American civil jury, and also conclude that it could enhance
the power of judges.
II. TOCQUEVILLE ON JUDGES AND JURIES
Alexis Charles-Henri-Maurice Clérel de Tocqueville (1805–1859)
was, like Montesquieu, a Frenchman, a nobleman, and a judge. Also like
Montesquieu, he spent some time living in an English-speaking country
with a common-law legal system. But with Tocqueville, we seem to be in
a different world. He was writing a century later than Montesquieu. France
had passed through an initially promising but then bloody revolution, a
dictatorship, and several regime changes after that. The American
Revolution had established a republic, with Montesquieuian separation of
powers, including a fully independent judiciary as a co-equal branch of
131. Id. at 438.
132. Id. at 437.
133. See ANTHONY J. BELLIA, JR. & BRADFORD R. CLARK, THE LAW OF
NATIONS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 121–24 (2017).
134. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, supra note 127, at 434.
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government. At the time Tocqueville visited America, the nation was in
the grip of an enthusiasm for democracy never equaled before or since. In
France, the nobility had been partly killed off during the revolution, and
the remnant had lost its former legal privileges and considerable property,
though it retained social prestige. Tocqueville entered a French judiciary
that was organized more or less along modern bureaucratic lines; offices
were no longer inherited, bought, and sold. The French government had
loosened controls on the press, and Tocqueville had no trouble publishing
his works in Paris under his own name. His style is much more direct than
Montesquieu’s. Although, like Montesquieu, he was trained in the
classics, he made far fewer references to ancient Greek and Roman
literature and practices. Tocqueville’s world is more familiar to us.
Yet, as we will see, many of his concerns were the same. Montesquieu
greatly influenced his thinking, as Tocqueville’s letter to his cousin,
quoted in the Introduction, suggests. Like Montesquieu, Tocqueville
believed that the judiciary was a moderating force that was key to
preserving liberty. And he believed that the purpose of juries was to
enhance the judges’ power. He was much more open about the
mechanism: judicial comment on evidence and instructions to the jury.
A. Tocqueville’s Judicial Career, Travels in America, and Democracy in
America
Tocqueville had reasons to be interested in political stability and
moderation. He was an aristocrat with family estates in Normandy. During
the French Revolution, his parents were imprisoned in a dungeon and
many of his relatives guillotined. After that, France went through a
republic, an imperial dictatorship under Napoleon, and a restored
monarchy.
Tocqueville also had a particular interest in law and the legal system;
he was a judge. Americans often overlook his judicial career. But his close
involvement with the legal system sheds light on his views about America
and democracy. And his operating in an inquisitorial system provides a
striking contrast with, and perspective on, the common-law system.
Tocqueville got his job as a judge through family influence. Under the
Bourbon Restoration (1814–1830), the old nobility was in favor, and
Tocqueville’s family achieved some political prominence. His father
became the prefect of Versailles. Thanks to his father, in 1827 after a
period of legal studies the 21-year-old Tocqueville got a job in the
Versailles prefecture as a juge-auditeur.135 French courts were divided into
135. HUGH BROGAN, ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE: A LIFE 76–77 (2006).
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two chambers, one for hearing and deciding cases, and the other for
investigating and prosecuting. The latter was and is known as the parquet,
from the parquet floors on which its members stood to speak. The jugeauditeur was the lowest position in the parquet. This was an unsalaried
position for young gentlemen. Tocqueville’s job was to investigate both
civil and criminal matters and to prepare written reports on his findings for
the adjudicating chamber of the court. In a common-law system, this work
would have been done almost entirely by the lawyers or other agents of
the parties, not by a judge.
The ambitious young man worked hard. During his time as a jugeauditeur, he investigated and prepared reports in about 60 cases, and the
reports were thorough. Some of the civil cases were suits by nobles to
recover lands and other property lost during the revolution.
Understandably, given his background, he sympathized with the
dispossessed nobles, but he concluded that the intervening transactions
could not be undone. He also, on occasion, appeared as a prosecutor before
the highest criminal court of Versailles. His immediate boss, Gustave de
Beaumont, another aristocrat a few years older who became Tocqueville’s
close friend, wrote that Tocqueville impressed the judges with his
intelligence and maturity of judgment.136
Tocqueville expected that this position would be the beginning of a
legal career. He was eager for promotion to a higher-level—and salaried—
position in the judiciary. But political events intervened. In July 1830,
France underwent yet another revolution. Tocqueville was in Paris when
it happened, and at the time he wrote to his future wife about hearing the
“cries of fury and despair” in the street and his horror at seeing
“Frenchmen cutting each other’s throats for fun.”137 The July Revolution
produced the new king Louis-Philippe, the “bourgeois king,” and once
again the old aristocracy was suspect. The upheaval stymied Tocqueville’s
judicial career.
America was an escape. Tocqueville’s relative, the poet and political
figure François-René de Chateaubriand, inspired him to take an interest in
America. Thirty-five years before, during another time of political turmoil
in France, Chateaubriand had visited America. He had recently written two
books about it.138 Why not Tocqueville? Tocqueville hatched a plan to visit
America with his friend Beaumont. But neither wanted to resign his
136. Id. at 78–84. On Tocqueville’s lifelong friendship with Beaumont, see
ANDRÉ JARDIN, TOCQUEVILLE: A BIOGRAPHY 79–81 (Lydia Davis trans., 1988)
(first published in French in 1984).
137. BROGAN, supra note 135, at 129–30 (Tocqueville to Mary Mottley).
138. FRANÇOIS-RENÉ DE CHATEAUBRIAND, LES NATCHEZ (1826); FRANÇOISRENÉ DE CHATEAUBRIAND, VOYAGE EN AMÉRIQUE (1827).
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judicial post. The new regime was interested in reform movements.
Tocqueville and Beaumont declared to their superiors that they wanted to
go on a fact-finding mission to study American prisons. America was then
viewed as at the forefront of penal reform. Official permission was
granted, their two families agreed to pay for the trip, and off they went.139
From the first, Tocqueville had in mind a broad study of American
society. In May 1831, he and Beaumont landed in New York City and
spent the next nine months touring the United States, with an excursion
into Canada. They collected documents, read books and newspapers,
attended public meetings and private social functions, and spoke with
Americans in all regions. Their voyages remind us of the vast geography
and variety of North America: from New York City into upstate New
York, across Lake Erie to Detroit, up to Québec and Montréal, down to
Boston and Hartford, then to Philadelphia and Baltimore, over to Pittsburg
and Cincinnati, and overland through Kentucky and Tennessee. From
Memphis, Tocqueville and Beaumont chugged down the Mississippi
River by steamboat to New Orleans and over to Mobile, and from there
overland up to Norfolk, Virginia. During that grueling 900-mile journey,
they passed through Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, and North
Carolina. From Norfolk they headed up to the capital in Washington.
Finally, in late February 1832, they sailed from New York for France.140
Back in France, in 1835 Tocqueville published the first volume of his
Democracy in America. The second volume followed in 1840. Tocqueville
was fascinated by the new type of government he observed in America.
He saw that a trend toward democracy was likely in France. In a letter
home, he wrote that unlimited democracy in his native country was “an
irresistible force.” He added, “I don’t say this is a good thing.”141 So for
Tocqueville, the visit to America was like a glimpse into the future of his
own society.
In Democracy in America, Tocqueville was aiming to reveal how
democracy was sustained and controlled. What interested him was not so
much Americans’ fractiousness, but what contained their fractiousness. He
wanted to understand the forces that curbed democracy and partisanship,
that made it sustainable, at least in the medium term, without resort to the
bloodshed so familiar in France. Like Montesquieu, he was looking for
moderating forces. And, like Montesquieu, he believed that one of these
was an aristocracy.
139. BROGAN, supra note 135, at 135–47.
140. Id. at 148–213.
141. Id. at 159 (Tocqueville to Kergorlay). Tocqueville’s interest in curbs on
democracy is the theme of Paul Carrese’s recent work. CARRESE, DEMOCRACY IN
MODERATION, supra note 11, at 78–104.
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But where was an aristocratic principle to be found in America?
Americans seemed more ferociously egalitarian by the day. That is, they
were egalitarian as to white men. In 1828, shortly before Tocqueville’s
visit, Andrew Jackson was elected president. The era of Jacksonian
Democracy had begun. The first half of the nineteenth century in America
was the age of popular elections. Large numbers of white men, of all
classes, began to vote in elections and to participate in civil discourse. In
state after state, property restrictions on voting fell. By 1830, virtually all
white men 21 years or older could vote. No longer was politics mainly a
gentleman’s game. Gone were speeches and writings filled with classical
allusions, and pseudonyms drawn from the Roman republic, such as
Brutus and Publius. In their place, a plainer style of discourse emerged,
aimed at all classes. Vanished were closed party caucuses and many
executive and legislative appointments. Parties met to pick candidates in
open, raucous conventions.142
Soon it seemed that every office possible was popularly elected, from
militia officers to judges. One delegate to a state constitutional convention
quipped, “We have provided for the popular election of every public
officer save the dog catcher, and if the dogs could vote, we should have
that as well.”143 Secrecy was abhorred.144 Citizens had to see proceedings
to have a role in decision-making. Ordinary Americans took an intense
interest in politics. Tocqueville struggled to describe Americans’
“ceaseless agitation” over politics. “It is hard to explain the place filled by
political concerns in the life of an American. To take a hand in the
government of society and to talk about it is his most important business
and, so to say, the only pleasure he knows.”145 This preoccupation
pervaded all of life and society. Even the women, he wrote, went to public
meetings and listened to political speeches as recreation from their
household labors. For Americans, debating clubs substituted for
theaters.146
Amidst this democratic frenzy, Tocqueville believed that he found the
most important curbing force: the legal profession.

142. ROBERT H. WIEBE, SELF-RULE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 21, 67–68 (1995).
143. Kermit L. Hall, The Judiciary on Trial: State Constitutional Reform and
the Rise of an Elected Judiciary, 1846-1860, 45 HISTORIAN 337, 340–41 (1983).
144. On distrust of secrecy and turn toward public debate beginning in
eighteenth-century Europe, see KESSLER, supra note 114, at 109–11.
145. 1 TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, supra note 4, at 243.
146. Id.
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B. Tocqueville on the American Legal Profession
To understand Tocqueville’s views about the jury, we must
understand his opinion of American lawyers and judges. The section
immediately before his famous discussion of the jury concerns lawyers
and judges. Tocqueville characterized the legal profession as “the only
aristocratic element” which could mingle with democracy and temper the
tyranny of the majority. “It is at the bar or the bench that the American
aristocracy is to be found.”147 In American towns and cities, lawyers were
typically the most intellectual citizens. The study of law gave lawyers a
natural preference for order and formalities. Every day they had to direct
“the blind passions of litigants” toward legal objectives, which gave
lawyers “a certain scorn for the judgment of the crowd.”148 Tocqueville
attributed to American lawyers the aristocratic and moderating influence
that Montesquieu reserved for judges.
In painting his picture of order-loving lawyers, Tocqueville glossed
over lawyers’ potential for demagoguery. Recall that Montesquieu had
warned about the people’s susceptibility to demagogues.149 This
demagoguery could function on a grand scale, whipping up emotion on
great political issues, or on a smaller scale, fomenting among the jury and
populace “blind passions” in favor of their clients. Contemporary
American observers—including artists—thought that lawyers’ potential
for demagoguery was a great danger, both to politics and to the legal
system.150 One of these critics was Abraham Lincoln, himself a lawyer and
politician, and a successful advocate before juries. In his famous
Springfield Lyceum address in 1838, Lincoln pleaded with Americans to
reject a political discourse of emotion in favor of reason. Otherwise, he
warned, American democratic institutions were in danger.151 Some of the
greatest skeptics about the civil jury were judges who had been lawyers
with extraordinary skill at rousing juror emotion.152 Tocqueville seems to

147. Id. at 266, 268. The chapter is entitled “The Temper of the American
Legal Profession and How It Serves to Counterbalance Democracy.” Id. at 263.
148. Id. at 264.
149. See supra text accompanying note 64.
150. Lerner, The Transformation of the American Civil Trial, supra note 65,
at 233–39; LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 52, at 516–21.
151. DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 80–82 (1995).
152. One of these judges was Joseph Lumpkin, Chief Judge of the Georgia
Supreme Court. See Renée Lettow Lerner, The Failure of Originalism in
Preserving Constitutional Rights to Civil Jury Trial, 22 WM. & MARY BILL OF
RIGHTS J. 811, 834–35 (2014).
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have counted on the judge’s firm guidance in instructions and comment
on evidence to the jury to counteract the effects of lawyers’ rhetoric.
Tocqueville also ignored lawyers’ character as a special-interest
group. Not everything that was good for lawyers was good for the nation.
The American legal system was widely believed to be too unpredictable,
prone to delays, and expensive.153 Under these conditions, lawyers
prospered.
Why did Tocqueville have such a favorable view of American
lawyers? Why did he tend to overlook the harm that lawyers did? It is
possible that Tocqueville may have been too influenced by a bias in his
sources. In his travel notebooks, he recorded conversations with a large
number of “distinguished lawyers.”154 It was natural that Tocqueville
would seek out lawyers. He shared with them a professional interest in
law. And lawyers tended to be more educated, and to have more
intellectual tastes and a deeper knowledge of government, than other
Americans. He may have been too swayed by their flattering portrait of
their profession.
But it is also possible that his favorable view of American lawyers was
part of his admiration for the common-law legal system. Throughout his
writings, this admiration was a significant theme. Like Montesquieu, he
viewed the common-law system as liberty-enhancing. From personal
experience, he was deeply aware of the flaws of his own legal system in
France. Tocqueville was not blind to the flaws of the common-law,
adversarial systems. He could portray them as grievous. In the notes to his
1856 book on the French Ancien Régime, he laid out the common-law
system’s flaws with devastating clarity. In England, he wrote, justice was
expensive and full of delays. There was a striking lack of inferior courts
with power to render speedy and inexpensive justice to poor litigants.155
(England had begun to address this problem with the County Courts Act

153. Id. at 846–50.
154. “Avocats distingués.” ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, JOURNEY TO AMERICA
52–54, 221–22 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans., 1960) (1831). See
GEORGE W. PIERSON, TOCQUEVILLE AND BEAUMONT IN AMERICA 383–89, 530
(1938); BROGAN, supra note 135, at 192; DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING
EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE
ATLANTIC WORLD, 1664-1830 301–02 (2005); Albert W. Dzur, Democracy’s
“Free School”: Tocqueville and Lieber on the Value of the Jury, 38 POL. THEORY
603, 606–07, 610–12 (2010).
155. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, THE ANCIEN RÉGIME AND THE FRENCH
REVOLUTION 254–256 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., Jon Elster ed., 2011) (1856).
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of 1846.156) In comparison, the French legal system was a model of
efficiency and rationality.
Still, Tocqueville believed the advantages of the common-law system
outweighed the disadvantages, at least in curbing government tyranny. He
was impressed with the English and American ability to maintain political
order with a measure of freedom. A striking difference between France
and those two countries was a subject close to him: the legal system. A
major reason for the relative stability and liberty of the nations must lie
there.
The key, Tocqueville believed, was the small number, high quality,
and independence of the common-law judges. Such judges inspired
respect and could effectively check political excesses. They were a sort of
aristocracy that could serve as a moderating, liberty-promoting force.
In his travel journal, Tocqueville commented on the special role that
judges played in the American scheme of separation of powers—which
was the first fully modern scheme, because America was the first true mass
democracy. “A completely democratic government is so dangerous an
instrument that, even in America, men have been obliged to take a host of
precautions against the errors and passions of Democracy. The
establishment of two chambers, the governor’s veto, and above all the
establishment of the judges.”157
American judges, Tocqueville wrote, combined the usual
conservative, lawyerly tendencies with an interest in maintaining order for
the sake of their office.158 That office carried great political power.
Tocqueville made much of the power of judicial review.159 This power did
not exist in England or in France. At least, in England there was no power
to declare acts of Parliament void. American judges, armed with the power
to declare laws unconstitutional, were constantly intervening in political
affairs. A judge “cannot compel the people to make laws, but at least he
can constrain them to be faithful to their own laws and remain in harmony
with themselves.”160 An important constraint on this “immense political
power” was that judges were passive and had to wait for an actual dispute
to arise and be presented to them.161 On the surface at least, Tocqueville
did not share the Anti-Federalists’ concern that there was no check if
judges abused the power of judicial review. He explained that the federal
Constitution could be amended, and the people could thereby “reduce the
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
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judges to obedience.”162 In this context, Tocqueville glossed over the
difficulty of amending the federal Constitution.
Tocqueville’s writing returned again and again to the fact that England
and America, compared with France, had very few judges. Their small
numbers made the judges more prestigious and powerful. At least, it did if
the judges had long, guaranteed tenure. Tocqueville was alarmed that
some American states elected judges for short tenures. He predicted that,
sooner or later, judicial elections would have “dire results.” Such elections
subverted judges’ independence and made it impossible for judges to play
their proper role in curbing democracy.163
Tocqueville’s emphasis on the power of judges immensely affected
his view of the value of the jury. According to Tocqueville, the jury was
actually a curb on democracy and the tyranny of the majority. To many
Americans, the jury seemed like a manifestation of direct democracy. How
could the jury be a restraint on democracy?
C. Tocqueville on the Jury as a Judicial Institution
Tocqueville did not repeat Anglo-American cheerleading slogans
about the jury. He wrote that the jury could be considered as a judicial
institution, or as a political institution.164
As a judicial institution, Tocqueville strongly implied, the jury fell
short. It fell short particularly in civil cases. “If it were a question of
deciding how far the jury, especially the jury in civil cases, facilitates the
good administration of justice, I admit that its usefulness can be
contested.”165 The jury system, he wrote, arose “in the infancy of society,”
when the English were “a semibarbarian people.” At that time, courts
decided only simple questions of fact. It was “no easy task to adapt it to
the needs of a highly civilized nation, where the relations between men
have multiplied exceedingly and have been thoughtfully elaborated in a
learned manner.”166As a judicial institution, the jury did not seem at all
suited to a complex commercial society with necessarily elaborate laws.
Nevertheless, Tocqueville wrote, the English had hastened to establish
juries in their colonies all over the globe, and everywhere alike extolled
the institution. The institution “cannot be contrary to the spirit of
justice.”167
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
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Tocqueville did mention one advantage of the jury considered as a
judicial institution. He discussed this point in a footnote in his chapter on
the jury considered as a political institution.168 In Tocqueville’s view, the
great advantage of the jury considered as a judicial institution was one that
no one from the common-law world had discussed. The jury allowed the
number of judges to be reduced.169 Instead of having to investigate and
decide the facts himself, as on the continent of Europe, a judge could
simply allow the parties to investigate and present facts and hand the case
to a jury. Thus, the system needed fewer judges.
Tocqueville did not mention the enormous role that advocates play in
investigating and presenting facts in an adversarial system. That feature,
more than juries, reduces the number of judges needed. In England and the
United States, the work that Tocqueville had done as a junior judge
investigating cases would have been done entirely by the parties.
This reliance on the parties to investigate and present facts produces
two major problems: the bias effect and the wealth effect.170 It is the
responsibility of parties—meaning their lawyers—to find and “prepare”
witnesses. This party control of witnesses, together with the likelihood that
the other party will vigorously attack witness credibility on crossexamination, tends to drive witnesses to shade testimony heavily in favor
of the side that called them. And wealthier parties have an advantage in
being able to fund more extensive investigation and skillful presentation.
These problems of the adversarial system persist regardless of the quality
of the judge.
For Tocqueville, fewer judges were a “great advantage” for two
reasons. First, in a large and hierarchical judiciary, as in France, death was
constantly producing gaps that ambitious judges strove to fill, by moving
up the hierarchy. Their independence was therefore questionable, as they
were apt to curry favor with whatever group or individual was making the
appointment. Tocqueville analogized judicial promotion to promotion in
the military.171 His argument about lack of judicial independence may
reflect his frustration at having his career stalled because of his family
being disfavored under the Louis-Phillipe monarchy. Tocqueville had
been an ambitious young judge himself. He had worked hard and well in
order to get promoted. In the judiciary of modern European countries, as
in the U.S. military, this ambition is not so much considered a problem but
a feature. It helps to encourage good performance in the job.
168. Id. at 272 n.4.
169. Id.
170. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 102–
05, 265–66 (2003).
171. TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, supra note 4, at 272 n.4.
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Second, Tocqueville wrote, in a smaller judiciary the quality of judges
was likely to be higher.172 The key to making the jury system work
properly, therefore, was for the judge to guide the jury. “For my part, I
would rather have a case decided by an ignorant jury guided by a skilled
judge than hand it over to judges, most of whom have an incomplete
knowledge both of jurisprudence and of the laws.”173 In other words, better
an ignorant jury guided by a good judge than mediocre judges.
D. Tocqueville on the Jury as a Political Institution: “A Free School”
Tocqueville’s brief discussion of the jury as a judicial institution set
the stage for his famous argument about the jury as a political institution.
Those who quote Tocqueville superficially miss this point. The key to
Tocqueville’s argument about the jury as a political institution is that the
jurors must be firmly guided by a good judge.
1.Tocqueville’s Similarity to Montesquieu, and His New Idea
Tocqueville was at his most Montesquieuian in the beginning of his
chapter on the jury as a political institution. Like Montesquieu, he
proclaimed that the jurors actually were the judges. At least, Tocqueville
wrote that they were so in criminal cases. Tocqueville seemed to be saying
that criminal jurors were even more powerful than Montesquieu had
suggested. Tocqueville wrote: “[T]he man who is judge in criminal trial is
the real master of society. Now, a jury puts the people themselves or at
least one class of citizen on the judge’s bench. Therefore the jury as an
institution really puts control of society into the hands of the people or of
that class.”174
172. Id.; see also 1 STEPHEN, supra note 21, at 521–22 (“The largeness of the
number of the French judges cannot but diminish very greatly their importance in
comparison with that of English judges.”).
173. TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, supra note 4, at 272 n.4
(emphasis added). The French reads, “Quant à moi, j’aimerais mieux abandonner
la décision d’un procès à des jurés ignorants dirigés par un magistrat habile, que
de la livrer à des juges dont la majorité n’aurait qu’une connaissance incomplète
de la jurisprudence et des lois.”
174. Id. at 272–73. Tocqueville mentions the idea that the jury might be drawn
from “one class” because he was also referring to the English jury. He thought of
English jurors as being “aristocratic.” (English petty jurors had to meet property
qualifications, but to call them aristocratic was quite a stretch. Generally, they
were of the middling sort. In contrast, English grand jurors did come from the
upper classes.) Tocqueville stated that, in America, every citizen could vote and
be a juror. Id. at 273. So in America the jurors were from the people as a whole.
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So far, Tocqueville seemed to be closely following Montesquieu’s
playbook. But then he made a series of strange statements about juries in
civil cases. Montesquieu had claimed that the jurors were the judges in
both criminal and civil cases.175 Tocqueville distinguished the two.
Tocqueville did not say that the jurors were the judges in civil cases. He
did write that in civil cases, because juries were so prominent, they
affected so many interests, and “everyone serves on them,” “it is hardly
too much to say that the idea of justice becomes identified with” the civil
jury.176 He claimed that the jury was always vulnerable as long as juries
were only used in criminal cases. But if juries were also used in civil cases,
the institution became permanent. So it was “the civil jury that really saved
the liberties of England.”177
That statement about civil juries seemed dramatic and
counterintuitive, but more was to come. Tocqueville wrote that no matter
how a nation used juries, juries were bound to have an influence on the
national character. “But that influence is immeasurably increased the more
they are used in civil cases.”178
At this point, the reader should be puzzled. We have seen that
Tocqueville, like Montesquieu, had grave misgivings about the ability of
the people to judge. Tocqueville has just told us that his misgivings were
especially strong in civil cases. We have also seen that Tocqueville, like
Montesquieu, extolled the power of the professional judiciary and thought
that it was vital to moderating government and preserving liberty. Why,
then, did he think that civil juries were so important?
Tocqueville next proclaimed a startling idea.
The point of the jury, especially the civil jury, was not to judge fairly
between litigants. Nor was it to prevent tyranny, at least not directly. Nor
was it to legitimize judgments in the eyes of the people. Instead, explained
Tocqueville, the purpose of the jury was to educate the jurors. The jurors
were not a means to an end; they were the end. The institution existed for
them. Tocqueville declared that the jury was “a free school” for
democracy. “I do not know whether a jury is useful to the litigants, but I
am sure it is very good for those who have to decide the case. I regard it

175. MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, supra note 2, at 157 (claiming that
the typical juror “punishes crimes or judges disputes between individuals”;
“judging the crimes or the disputes of individuals”). Though he did emphasize
criminal cases. Id. at 158–59.
176. TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, supra note 4, at 274.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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as one of the most effective means of popular education at society’s
disposal.”179
In a moment, we will see how Tocqueville thought that education was
supposed to take place. Again, we will encounter a startling idea. But first,
we will take a look at the antecedents of Tocqueville’s concept of the jury
as a school and that concept’s inseparable connection with democracy.
2. American Antecedents for the Idea of the Jury as a School
The rationale of the jury as a school could only have arisen in the
context of a democracy. And the United States was the first mass
democracy. Recall the classic concern about democracies, that the people
would be inadequate to the demands of politics.180 As Martin Diamond put
it, “The history of modern democracy is a history of the effort to balance
the equation between the demands of the political and the capacity of the
many.”181 Lowering the demands of the political, by setting out modest
aims for government, could help—so could raising the capacity of the
many. Hence in almost all democracies there is a strong faith in popular
education.
Montesquieu emphasized that in a republic, and especially a
democracy, education was vital. Democratic republics depended on
citizens having political virtue. This virtue was difficult to achieve.
“[S]uch virtue is a renunciation of oneself, which is always a very painful
thing.”182 He defined this virtue as love of the laws and the homeland.
Education should attentively cultivate this love. Without love of the laws
and the homeland, a democratic republic would fail. “Now government is
like all things in the world; in order to preserve it, one must love it.” 183
Montesquieu did not mention the jury as a possible way to educate the
citizenry in love of the laws and the homeland, but one of his careful
readers did.
To see the importance of democracy in changing the rationale of the
jury, a comparison with England is instructive. Blackstone praised the jury
to the skies.184 He had learned well from his mentor Montesquieu how to
conceal judicial power.185 He pretended, along with Montesquieu, that
179. Id. at 275.
180. See supra text accompanying note 33.
181. Diamond, supra note 28, at 39.
182. MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, supra note 2, at 35 (bk. 4, ch. 5).
183. Id. at 36.
184. See, e.g., 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 78, at *379, *385.
185. On Blackstone’s relationship to Montesquieu, see CARRESE, THE
CLOAKING OF POWER, supra note 15, at 111–12.
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English jurors really did decide the facts all by themselves. He entirely
omitted any discussion of judges’ dominance of the jury through comment
and instruction.186 When one cuts through Blackstone’s voluminous
hyperbole and finds his reasons for the institution, the main one he gave
reflected the mixed regime: class bias. Class divides were deep in
eighteenth-century England. Because the judges might have “an
involuntary bias toward those of their own rank and dignity,”187 the
common people, the jurors, should be and were incorporated into judicial
decision-making. Blackstone did not suggest any purpose of educating
jurors in self-governance. There would be no point. England in the
eighteenth century was not a democracy.
But a democracy did arise a few decades later across the ocean, and
there we see the first stirrings of the idea that jury service could be used
for education in the art of politics. Democracy, modern separation of
powers, and the idea of the jury as a school for self-governance developed
together.
In America, there were precedents for Tocqueville’s idea of the
educative purpose of the jury. One precedent was the practice in the early
republic of federal grand jury charges. Soon after the new nation was
formed, the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court began riding circuit around
the country. During the 1790s, many of them delivered charges to federal
grand juries that were explicitly intended to educate jurors in the
knowledge and manners needed for republican self-governance.188 Often
local newspapers printed these charges. Justice James Wilson even
incorporated parts of his academic lectures on law into grand jury
charges.189 But the justices had to be careful not to be too overtly political
186. On Blackstone’s concealment of the realities of judge-jury relations, see
Langbein, Blackstone on Judging, supra note 44, at 70–71. On the dominance of
English judges over the jury, see supra text accompanying notes 82–90.
187. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 78, at *379.
188. Wilmarth, supra note 99, at 162–63; Ralph Lerner, The Supreme Court
as Republican Schoolmaster, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 131–55; David J. Katz,
Grand Jury Charges Delivered by Supreme Court Justices Riding Circuit During
the 1790s, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1045, 1054–62, 1072–83 (1993). A number of
federal grand jury charges are printed and annotated in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800 (Maeva Marcus ed.,
1988). Lengthy grand jury charges were a long-standing American practice. In
their charges to grand juries, American colonial and state judges sometimes
covered a wide range of topics involving government. STANTON D. KRAUSS,
GENTLEMEN OF THE GRAND JURY: THE SURVIVING GRAND JURY CHARGES FROM
COLONIAL, STATE, AND LOWER FEDERAL COURTS BEFORE 1801 (2012) (2
volumes).
189. Wilmarth, supra note 99, at 162 n.292.
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in teaching grand jurors, as the impeachment of Justice Samuel Chase in
1804 showed.190
Whether Tocqueville was aware of this earlier practice of educative
grand jury charges is unclear. If Tocqueville knew about it, he transformed
the idea considerably in Democracy in America. Federal judges had used
mainly criminal cases and especially grand jury charges to educate jurors.
Tocqueville, as we will see, thought that jurors needed little education in
criminal matters. For him, civil cases were the main classroom for judges
to teach jurors.
There was another source from which Tocqueville might have derived
the idea of the jury as a school. This was Edward Livingston’s widely-read
1822 report on the penal code he had drafted for Louisiana.191 Livingston
was originally from New York. In his report, Livingston explained that he
was giving a thorough account of reasons for the jury because Louisiana
had no practice of jury trial under Spanish or French rule.192 Again, an
encounter with the civil law prompted an important explanation of the
common-law institution. In the context of arguing for the rule that a
criminal defendant should not be able to waive jury trial, Livingston
pointed to the institution’s benefits to the public. One of the reasons
Livingston gave was thoroughly American: “It diffuses the most valuable
information among every rank of citizens; it is a school, of which every
jury that is empaneled, is a separate class; where the dictates of the laws,
and the consequences of disobedience to them, are practically taught.”193
It would be surprising if Tocqueville had not read Livingston’s report.
Tocqueville was especially interested in Louisiana because of the mixture
of civil law and common law elements in its legal system. Livingston’s
report was published in London in 1824. Tocqueville met with Livingston,
then Secretary of State, in Washington. In Democracy in America,
Livingston is the only interlocutor whom Tocqueville mentions by name.
There Tocqueville says of him, “Mr. Livingston is one of those rare men
190. Among U.S. Supreme Court justices, the practice of educative grand jury
charges came to a halt with the impeachment of Justice Samuel Chase in 1804 in
part for what were perceived to be his partisan charges to grand juries.
Demonstrating that the Anti-Federalists had been right about the limits of
impeachment, the politically hostile Senate voted to acquit Chase by significant
margins.
191. EDWARD LIVINGSTON, PROJECT OF A NEW PENAL CODE FOR THE STATE
OF LOUISIANA (London, Baldwin, Cradock, and Joy 1824). The General
Assembly of Louisiana originally published the report. Id. at iii. See Dzur, supra
note 154, at 611–12.
192. LIVINGSTON, supra note 191, at 13.
193. Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
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whose writings inspire affection, so that we admire and respect them even
before we know them.”194
But Tocqueville significantly altered Livingston’s idea. For
Livingston, as for early federal judges, criminal cases were the vital
classroom. And Livingston portrayed the judge as distant, more like a
principal in this school than a teacher.195
It was in conversations with officials, lawyers, and judges in Boston
and Philadelphia that Tocqueville more fully developed his idea of the
civil jury as a school, with the judge as skillful teacher. These persons had
doubts about the competence of jurors to decide cases.196 According to
Tocqueville’s notes, in Boston, Francis Calley Gray, a prison inspector
and state senator, told him that the courts were the most powerful part of
government in the state and that civil trials, especially, encouraged a
“union and mutual confidence” between “the people and the
magistracy.”197 Charles Pelham Curtis, the legal solicitor of Boston,
emphasized that civil juries were less competent than judges but,
nevertheless, enjoyed great public support. Soon after these conversations,
Tocqueville drafted a short essay on the jury arguing that the use of juries
supported the power of judges.198
Tocqueville saw jury trials in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and
Cincinnati. Tocqueville met with a federal judge in Boston, but does not
appear to have been overly moved by the judge telling him that American
judges often deferred to juries, even when the judges disagreed with
verdicts and had the power to overturn them.199
Probably Tocqueville’s most significant conversation about the jury
occurred in Philadelphia with Henry D. Gilpin. The two men spoke for
half a day. Considering his background, Gilpin’s politics were unusual.
Despite an elite banking and manufacturing family, extensive English
connections, a fine classical education, literary interests, and success at the

194. TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, supra note 4, at 19–20 n.2.
Tocqueville mentioned that Livingston was later U.S. Minister to France, and
living in Paris. Livingston served in that role from 1833 to 1835, while
Tocqueville was also in Paris and writing Democracy in America.
195. I am indebted to Albert Dzur for this analogy. Dzur, supra note 154, at 612.
196. See id. at 611.
197. TOCQUEVILLE, JOURNEY TO AMERICA, supra note 154, at 52–54.
198. Id. at 295–97. In a letter to his friend Chabrol dated November 26, 1831,
Tocqueville described how jury trial, influenced by the judge, contributed to the
education of citizens. JARDIN, supra note 136, at 159–60.
199. TOCQUEVILLE, JOURNEY TO AMERICA, supra note 154, at 222.
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Philadelphia bar, Gilpin became a fervent Jacksonian Democrat.200 In
1831, Jackson appointed him U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, and in 1840, under President Martin Van Buren, he became
Attorney General of the United States. This strange phenomenon of a
highly elite Northern Jacksonian provided Tocqueville an important key
to his view of democracy in America.
According to Tocqueville’s notes, Gilpin expressed doubts about the
jury as a judicial institution in terms similar to what Tocqueville later
wrote in Democracy in America.201 But Tocqueville was more critical of
the jury in that respect than Gilpin. Apparently Gilpin, like Livingston,
referred to the jury as a school. Notwithstanding his Jacksonian politics,
Gilpin seems to have believed that this school was effective because of the
elite qualities of the teachers, lawyers, and judges:
The jury is a school where the people come to learn their rights,
where they come into contact with the most learned and
enlightened of the upper classes, where the laws are taught in a
practical way and one within the scope of their intelligence, by the
most intelligent minds.202
And Gilpin thought that, viewing the jury as a school, the civil jury was
more important than the criminal.203 Civil cases affected interests
throughout society, even more pervasively than criminal cases.
Here was the germ of Tocqueville’s idea, the answer to his search for
the aristocratic, moderating element in American society.
3. The Judge as Teacher and Firm Guide
The implications of the jury as a school are almost never fully aired.
What are the benefits of this education? How is this education
200. His conversion to the Jacksonian cause occurred immediately after the
election of John Quincy Adams in the bargain of 1824. Ralph D. Gray, Henry D.
Gilpin: A Pennsylvania Jacksonian, 37 PA. HIST. J. MID-ATL. STUD. 340, 340–45
(1970). Thereafter Gilpin wholeheartedly supported Jacksonian positions,
including Indian removal and attacks on Nicholas Biddle’s control over the Bank
of the United States. Id. at 345–46.
201. Tocqueville recorded that Gilpin told him: “As far as the correct decision
in each case is concerned, it seems to me that the superiority of the jury as an
institution can be contested, though in this respect I am still inclined to think it
better than permanent tribunals.” TOCQUEVILLE, JOURNEY TO AMERICA, supra
note 154, at 286.
202. Id. at 287.
203. Id. at 286.
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accomplished? What does this rationale imply about the proper scope and
practice of jury trial? And, dare we ask, what are its costs?
In Democracy in America, Tocqueville largely ignored the question of
costs. “A free school,” Tocqueville called the jury. But it was not free—
not to the jurors, the litigants, nor the legal system. He addressed the other
three questions above, but many of the answers he gave differ sharply from
the answers given today. Despite hundreds of quotations of Tocqueville
on the jury as a school for democracy, his rationale for the jury is
misunderstood.
Tocqueville had no use for the argument often made today that what
educates jurors is the act of deliberating with fellow jurors. According to
this idea, jurors who deliberate together learn to listen to each other, to
hear different points of view, and to continue to reason together to achieve
a mutually agreeable outcome. Jury service therefore contributes to
deliberative democracy.204 Proponents of this argument downplay the
possibility that jurors might refuse to listen to each other, or be appalled at
the incompetence and misguidedness of their fellows, or crudely
compromise, or follow the leader. Tocqueville did not mention jurors
learning from deliberations at all. Indeed, his discussion suggests that,
without firm guidance from the judge, jury deliberations would be the
blind leading the blind.
In Tocqueville’s view, the key mechanisms for juror education were
not deliberations, but rather the juror’s individual situation and the judge’s
powerful guidance. Simply being put in the position of deciding a case
encouraged a juror to respect the laws and to realize that he was
responsible for his own acts. This was especially true in civil cases, as a
citizen was more likely to be a civil litigant than a criminal defendant.205
Such respect for the law and awareness of responsibility were essential in
a democracy. With this argument, Tocqueville emphasized the liberal idea
of individual responsibility. He also invoked civic republican ideas of the
common good. By focusing on someone else’s dispute, a juror’s service

204. See, e.g., Valerie P. Hans, John Gastil & Traci Feller, Deliberative
Democracy and the American Civil Jury, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 697, 697–
98 (2014) (setting out the standard theory before discussing empirical findings);
JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF
DEMOCRACY (1994); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND
DISAGREEMENT (1996); JAMES FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION (1991).
205. TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, supra note 4, at 274.
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combatted “that individual selfishness which is like rust in society” and
the particular danger of commercial democracies.206
For Tocqueville, at least equally important was education from the
contact that jurors had with “the best-educated and most-enlightened
members of the upper classes.” These were the lawyers and especially the
judge. These legal professionals taught the jurors “practical lessons in the
law.”207
In civil cases particularly, the judge provided that element of impartial,
intelligent authority—an “aristocratic body”—without which democracy
might descend into chaos. Criminal cases generally had simpler facts and
more easily understandable law. So in criminal cases, jurors’ independent
judgment could be more safely trusted.208 But in civil cases, jurors would
often be at a loss without the judge. In civil cases, “the judge appears as a
disinterested arbitrator between the litigants’ passions.” The jurors “feel
confidence in him and listen to him with respect, for here his intelligence
completely dominates theirs.”209 The judge cleared up confusion caused
by testimony and by the arguments of counsel:
It is he who unravels the various arguments they are finding it so
hard to remember and takes them by the hand to guide them
through procedural intricacies; it is he who limits their task to the
question of fact and tells them what answer to give on questions
of law.210
The result was that the jurors rendered the decision made by the judge.
“He has almost unlimited power over them.”211
In other words, according to Tocqueville, a large part of the jurors’
education was to learn to defer to a more competent authority.
Commentators on Tocqueville seldom mention, or perhaps notice, this
point.212 The judge’s supposed dominance over the civil jury was why
Tocqueville was not moved by arguments about the jury’s
incompetence.213 Jurors could be educated, and at the same time outcomes
206. Id. at 274. See LUCIEN JAUME, TOCQUEVILLE: THE ARISTOCRATIC
SOURCES OF LIBERTY 82–91 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2013) (first published
in French in 2008).
207. TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, supra note 4, at 275.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. An exception is Albert Dzur. See Dzur, supra note 154, at 613–14.
213. TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, supra note 4, at 275.
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of cases would not suffer too greatly from the decisions of incompetent
laypersons.
For Americans, Tocqueville’s description of the judge dominating a
civil jury is surprising, even shocking. That is not what happens today, and
it was not what happened in many American courtrooms at the time
Tocqueville was writing.214 Tocqueville exaggerated the power of the
judge, and he downplayed the power of the lawyers. He left out the sway
of lawyers’ rhetoric. His account softened the nature of the American
adversarial system.
In fact, Tocqueville’s account was accurate as a description of what
happened in English courtrooms. By the nineteenth century, English
judges had full independence. They enjoyed respect from the English legal
profession and society at large for their integrity and competence. They
had great powers to sum up and comment on evidence to the jury. English
judges did indeed dominate civil jury verdicts. An editorial in The Times
of London in 1850 suggested that 99 times out of 100, the verdict turned
on the judge’s view rather than the jury’s, because the jury eagerly
followed the judge. According to The Times, juries understood that the
“judge advocates the cause of truth alone.”215 Not surprisingly, many
persons in England thought that this judicial dominance was a good reason
to get rid of civil juries. The process began with the County Courts Act of
1846 and the Common Law Procedure Act of 1854. By 1965, the English
civil jury had virtually disappeared.216
But in America in the mid- and late-nineteenth century, as Tocqueville
feared, judicial elections undermined respect for the judiciary. Judges were
no longer fully independent. They could no longer exert the moderating
influence that Montesquieu and Tocqueville had hoped. Under pressure
from aggressive lawyers and concerned appellate judges, American trial
judges began to lose their powers to comment on evidence.217 A weak
judge could not guide jurors with authority.

214. For an example of a federal judge explaining to Tocqueville that even the
federal judge and his colleagues deferred to civil juries, see supra text
accompanying note 199.
215. Conor Hanly, The Decline of Civil Jury Trial in Nineteenth-Century
England, 26 J. LEGAL HIST. 253, 259 (2005) (quoting Editorial, TIMES LONDON
(29 Mar. 1850), at 4).
216. Id. at 255–59, 261–62, 266–67, 275–78.
217. Lerner, Transformation of the American Civil Trial, supra note 65, at
241–61; Kenneth A. Krasity, The Role of the Judge in Jury Trials: The
Elimination of Judicial Evaluation of Fact in American State Courts from 1795
to 1913, 62 U. DET. L. REV. 595, 621 (1985); Renée Lettow Lerner, How the
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Another difficulty with Tocqueville’s rationale is that it required
jurors to sit in civil cases, and plenty of them. How else were jurors to reap
the educational benefits? But serving as jurors in lots of civil cases was
exactly what more and more Americans were reluctant to do. In a market
economy, time is money. Americans increasingly wanted either to attend
to their own affairs, or to discuss matters of general public interest. They
did not want to waste time, as they saw it, deciding others’ individual
business disputes.218
E. American Transformation of Tocqueville’s Idea
Despite these difficulties, the American press and legal profession
soon picked up Tocqueville’s argument that the purpose of the jury was to
educate jurors. In the process, they transformed the rationale to make it
more palatable to democratic tastes.
Already in 1838, just three years after the original publication of
Democracy in America in Paris, a publisher in New York brought out an
English translation of the first volume.219 This American edition contained
the striking section on juries.
After that, American periodicals and judicial opinions spread
Tocqueville’s rationale with significant changes. The advent of New
York’s Field Code of 1848 renewed American debate about the civil jury.
In July 1848, the Monthly Law Reporter, a national periodical published
in Boston, printed an article about New York’s new code. The author was
the periodical’s 25-year-old editor, Stephen H. Phillips, a Massachusetts
native who had graduated from Harvard College and studied at Harvard
Law School under Joseph Story.220
Creation of Appellate Courts in England and the United States Limited Comment
on Evidence to the Jury, 40 J. LEGAL PRO. 215, 257–64, 266–68 (2016).
218. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE
CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK 545 (Albany, Office of the Evening Atlas 1846) (remarks of Mr. Hunt) (“I
would respect the just rights of all litigants, but at the same time remember that
men who are not litigants have rights also and ought not to be dragged from their
own business by the dozens to settle other people’s quarrels . . . .”); id. at 538
(remarks of Mr. Tallmadge); id. at 547 (remarks of Mr. Ruggles); id. at 829
(remarks of Mr. Brown); Colt v. Eves, 12 Conn. 243, 252 (1837); see Lerner, The
Failure of Originalism in Preserving Constitutional Rights to Civil Jury Trial,
supra note 152, at 848–49.
219. TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, supra note 6 (1838 American
edition).
220. Stephen H. Phillips, The New York Code of Procedure, 11 MONTHLY L.
REP. (n.s. vol. 1) 97 (July 1848). On Phillips’s life, see 1 DUANE HAMILTON
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Phillips eagerly propounded Tocqueville’s description of the civil jury
as a school. But this school was not one of deference to the judge. Rather,
a juror learned “to weigh facts, to balance arguments” for himself.
Tocqueville did not praise such independent thinking of the juror in civil
cases. And Phillips brought out the argument used so often today, which
Tocqueville never mentioned: the juror learned the habit of deliberation
with fellow jurors. This civic education improved his vote and turned a
man into a citizen.221
Phillips threw in another idea that Tocqueville had not mentioned. In
Tocqueville’s view, the judge saved the jury from confusion. In Phillips’s
view, the jury saved the judge from “isolation from the people.” That
isolation was “the first step toward secret proceedings and arbitrary
tribunals.” In other words, Phillips equated jury trial with public
proceedings, as if proceedings could not be public without a jury. He
praised the movement on the continent of Europe toward public trial by
jury.222 But, significantly, continental Europeans used lay jurors almost
exclusively in criminal cases.
American judicial opinions soon took up the refrain, with another
change. Only a few months later, Joseph Lumpkin, Chief Judge of the
Georgia Supreme Court, writing an opinion on the right to civil jury trial,
tracked Phillips’s argument almost exactly. He wrote that he and his
colleagues cordially concurred in Phillips’s “glowing” praise of trial by
jury. He gave all the rationales that Phillips gave, in the same language,
especially the idea of the jury as a school for democracy. But there was a
major difference. Phillips wrote in praise of the civil jury. Lumpkin wrote
that these rationales applied only to criminal juries.223 Lumpkin moved
even further from Tocqueville’s rationale, which applied mainly to civil
juries. In fact, Lumpkin’s praise of the criminal jury followed by his attack
on the civil jury closely tracked Alexander Hamilton’s arguments in The
Federalist number 83.
American commentators and judges thus conveniently lopped off
Tocqueville’s bold assertions about judicial power and the importance of
deference by jurors to judicial authority. Many of them also suppressed
Tocqueville’s doubts about the jury as a judicial institution. Such open
HURD, HISTORY OF ESSEX COUNTY, MASSACHUSETTS: WITH BIOGRAPHICAL
SKETCHES OF MANY OF ITS PIONEERS AND PROMINENT MEN xlviii-li
(Philadelphia, J.W. Lewis & Company 1888).
221. Phillips, supra note 220, at 109.
222. Id.
223. Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Foster, 5 Ga. 194, 205–06 (1848); Lerner,
The Failure of Originalism in Preserving Constitutional Rights to Civil Jury Trial,
supra note 152, at 834–35.
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doubts about the jury’s competence appeared unseemly at the peak of
fervor for democracy, although in practice judges and legislators had
begun to curtail jury power. After purging such uncomfortable points,
American writers were happy to follow Tocqueville in calling the jury a
“free school” for democracy. And so have American legal professionals
ever since.
CONCLUSION
American experience suggests that Montesquieu was largely right that
the jury acts as a mask for the power of the judiciary. The jury diverts
responsibility and attention from the judges. Even though our system
hardly holds jury trials anymore, the institution remains firmly planted in
American minds as the standard way cases are resolved. American judges,
both state and federal, are uniform in their glowing praise for the jury
system (at least in public). Nary a peep is heard from them about the
weaknesses of the jury. The judges have good professional reasons. This
judicial praise for the jury takes on an even more exaggerated quality as
judges assert ever greater power over the law and the other two branches
of government. The boldness of the American judiciary today is far from
the quiet, moderating influence that Montesquieu recommended. But
arguably the current American judicial power is the descendant of his
ideas.
Central to Montesquieu’s and Tocqueville’s notions of judges as the
guardians of liberty is judicial independence. The American federal
judiciary and that of some states are largely independent, free from
concern about their continued tenure in office. But judicial elections, as
Tocqueville feared, have undermined independence. As is well known, in
some judicial campaigns today vast contributions are collected from
interested parties. The donors expect that their contributions will have an
effect, and generally, they are not disappointed.
Meanwhile, the Anti-Federalists have proved correct in many of their
predictions about the federal judiciary. Appointed judges can be intensely
willful and disregard prudent limitations on judicial power. There is,
indeed, no control on them.
I think it fair to suggest that the use of juries in America has deflected
attention from the need to clean up and to restrain the judiciary. Americans
often pay too little attention to the integrity and competence of the state
judiciaries, and the jury is one of the reasons. The U.S. Supreme Court is,
predictably and inevitably, given our constitutional arrangements, the
focus of fierce political controversy. But the lower federal courts,
especially U.S. district judges, exercise considerable power with little
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oversight and less public knowledge. In this respect, Montesquieu’s idea
of the jury acting as a mask for the judiciary may have backfired. The jury
may act as a mask indeed, but for judicial corruption, incompetence, or
willfulness. Americans might comfort themselves with the notion that the
jury is acting as a backstop, but that is a false hope.
This Article points to some of the drawbacks of juries. Both
Montesquieu and Tocqueville, as judges in an inquisitorial system, were
attuned to this issue. Both recognized considerable weaknesses in the use
of lay jurors. They counted on the influence of the judge to guide the jury
to an appropriate decision.
But Montesquieu and Tocqueville did not anticipate the continued
pressure of the adversarial system. Lawyers in the American adversarial
system, especially, have worked hard to diminish the informal power of
the judge over the jury. Today, for example, it is unthinkable that an
American judge would comment on the evidence to the jury. John
Wigmore wrote that this one change had done more than anything else to
undermine the accuracy of jury trial.224 Juries are now at the mercy of
opposing counsel, with no buffer. The unpredictability of verdicts,
particularly as to damages, has caused rates of jury trial to plummet.225
Today, of federal civil cases reaching disposition after court action, jury
trial occurred in 0.65%.226 Despite civil jury trial rates of less than 1%, the
jury still affects outcomes. Settlement negotiations occur “in the shadow
of the jury,” trying to anticipate what a jury would do.227
Montesquieu and Tocqueville presupposed two important conditions
for the use of juries: competent judges of integrity and the ability of those
judges to guide and advise jurors. In the United States, those conditions no
224. 9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM
OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2551, at 504–505 (3d ed. 1940).

225. In a 2016 survey, 936 lawyers gave as their top three reasons why juryeligible cases did not go to jury trial: (1) “Parties reached a mutually agreeable
settlement”; (2) “Uncertainty of jury decision-making on damages”; and (3)
“Uncertainty of jury decision-making on liability.” AMERICAN SOCIETY OF TRIAL
CONSULTANTS & THE CIVIL JURY PROJECT AT NYU SCHOOL OF LAW, 2016
ATTORNEY SURVEY: DECLINING CIVIL JURY TRIALS 16 (Dec. 2016),
https://civiljuryproject.law.nyu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/ASTC-CJPAttorney-Survey-Report-2016.pdf.
226. Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics: March 31, 2019 (Table C-4),
ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/federal-judicial-caseloadstatistics-2019-tables (1,645 civil jury trials out of 251,441 total dispositions after
court action).
227. J.J. Prescott & Kathryn E. Spier, A Comprehensive Theory of Civil
Settlement, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 59, 68–80 (2016).
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longer apply. At least in civil cases, it may be time to drop the mask. This
society should see clearly what kind of judges it has, and their powers.
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